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Whistleblower advocates and academics greeted the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower provisions in 2002 with great acclaim. The
Act appeared to provide the strongest encouragement and broadest protections
then available for private-sector whistleblowers. It influenced whistleblower law
by unleashing a decade of expansive legal protection and formal encouragement
for whistleblowers, perhaps indicating societal acceptance of whistleblowers as
part of a broader law enforcement strategy. Despite these successes, however,
Sarbanes-Oxley's greatest lesson derives from its two most prominent failings.
First, over the last decade, the Act did not sufficiently protect whistleblowers
who suffered retaliation. Second, despite the massive increase in legal
protection available to them, whistleblowers did not play a significant role in
uncovering the financial crisis that led to the Great Recession at the end of the
decade. These related failures indicate that although whistleblowers had
stronger and more prevalent protection than ever before, they had less reason to
believe such protection works. This Article examines the developments in
whistleblower law during the last decade and concludes that Sarbanes-Oxley's
most important lesson is that the usual approach to whistleblowing may not be
sufficient. Encouragingly, this Article also evaluates recent developments in
light of Sarbanes-Oxley's successes and failures to demonstrate that
policymakers may have learned from the Sarbanes-Oxley experience. During
the last two years, regulators and legislators have implemented new strategies
that may encourage employees to blow the whistle more effectively.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001 and 2002, corporate scandals exploded in the United States as the
public learned about massive fraud at large companies such as Enron and
WorldCom.1 The fraud involved complicated accounting schemes that
artificially inflated the companies' value, resulting in the largest bankruptcies in
U.S. history.2  Thousands of people lost jobs and billions of dollars in
shareholder value disappeared, seemingly overnight.3
1. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 357-73 (2003) (discussing the whistleblowers in
both scandals); Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron 's Collapse: The Overview; Arthur
Andersen Fires an Executive for Enron Orders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at Al (outlining key
events in the Enron scandal and Arthur Andersen's involvement); Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas,
WorldCom's Collapse: The Overview; WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al (discussing WorldCom's bankruptcy and future financial outlook).
2. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some
Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495,
503 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) [hereinafter ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS]
("In short, Enron's collapse boiled down to massive accounting fraud and irregularities, a principal
feature of which was the use of structured finance techniques designed to get debt off Enron's
balance sheet and inflate Enron's profits."); Charles J. Tabb, The Enron Bankruptcy, in ENRON:
CORPORATE FIASCOS, supra, at 303, 303 & n.2 ("At the time, Enron was the largest bankruptcy
filing in history." However, "[s]ix months later, WorldCom surpassed this record.").
3. See, e.g., Robert G. Vaughn, America's First Comprehensive Statute Protecting
Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 2 (2005); Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B.
Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How Enron's Public Image Morphed from the Most Innovative
Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most Notorious Company Ever, in ENRON: CORPORATE
FIASCOS, supra note 2, at 77, 83 ("Enron seemed to go from 'most admired' status to 'most
despised' status in record time, once the revelations about the company's behavior became
public."). See generally Oppel & Eichenwald, supra note I (discussing the Enron collapse);
Romero & Atlas, upra note I (discussing the WorldCom bankruptcy).
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In the aftermath, Congress held hearings to investigate how the country's
corporate governance system and law enforcement agencies failed to detect the
deceptions earlier. 4  The hearings revealed that, although some employees
reported the fraud to company supervisors and officers, many employees who
knew about the wrongdoing simply kept quiet. 5 Encouraging these employees to
report corporate misconduct would help address the "corporate code of silence"
6that Congress determined had contributed to the fraud's concealment. As a
result, when Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20027 to address the
perceived causes of the meltdown, it included among the Act's wide-ranging
corporate governance provisions specific sections related to whistleblowers.8 At
the time, whistleblower advocates and academics greeted Sarbanes-Oxley's
enactment with great acclaim, because the Act appeared to provide the strongest
encouragement and broadest protections then available for private-sector
whistleblowers. 9 It seemed to be a watershed moment, representing a historic
shift in the country's attitude and approach towards whistleblowing.10
4. At least ten different Congressional committees held over forty-five different hearings
related to the Enron collapse. See Library of Congress, Guide to Law Online: Enron Hearings,
LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/federal/enronhrgs.php (last
updated July 25, 2012) (providing access to hearing transcripts). Congress also investigated
WorldCom and other corporate scandals. See, e.g., Wrong Numbers: The Accounting Problems at
WorldCom: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 91-92 (2002) (questioning
WorldCom and Arthur Andersen executives about the accounting practices that led to WorldCom's
collapse).
5. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1117-25 [hereinafter Moberly, Structural Model];
Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 74-75 (2007) [hereinafter Moberly,
Unfulfilled Expectations].
6. See S. REP. No. 107-146, at 4-5 (2002).
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C.).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006); see also Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5,
at 75-76 (noting four separate provisions aimed at encouraging and protecting whistleblowers).
9. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002) (quoting Letter from Jim Moorman, Exec.
Dir., Taxpayers Against Fraud & Tom Devine, Legal Dir., Gov't Accountability Project, to Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Chair, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 11, 2002), reprinted in 107 CONG. REC. 1791
(2002)) (calling Sarbanes-Oxley "the single most effective measure possible to prevent recurrences
of the Enron debacle and similar threats to the nation's financial markets"); Cynthia Estlund,
Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376
(2005) (calling Sarbanes-Oxley the "gold standard" of whistleblower protection); Vaughn, supra
note 3, at 105 (asserting that Sarbanes-Oxley is "the most important whistleblower protection law in
the world"); see also Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 68 (quoting responses from
academics, advocates, and the press).
10. See, e.g., Blowing the Whistle on Corporate Wrongdoing: An Interview with Tom Devine,
23 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, No. 10, Oct./Nov. 2002, available at http://www.multinationalmoni
tor.org/mm2002/102002/interview-devine.html (Tom Devine, the legal director for the Government
Accountability Project-a whistleblower advocacy group--described the Act as "the promised
land" and stated that "the law represents a revolution in corporate freedom of speech [that] far
surpasses, indeed laps, the rights available for government workers.").
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Now, ten years after the Act's passage, this Article takes a fresh look at its
whistleblower provisions to examine its successes and failures. Sarbanes-Oxley
has had a substantial impact on whistleblower law, but perhaps in some
counterintuitive and maybe even contradictory ways. As an initial matter,
Sarbanes-Oxley was enormously successful as a model for subsequent legal
measures that encourage and protect whistleblowers. However, despite these
successes, the Act's failures in other respects demonstrate that these traditional
strategies may not be sufficient to encourage effective whistleblowing.
To reach these conclusions, Part II of this Article describes the passage of
the Act and discusses the Act's whistleblower provisions in more detail. Then,
in Part III, I demonstrate that Sarbanes-Oxley unleashed a decade of expansive
whistleblower provisions. Federal and state governments passed an impressive
array of broad antiretaliation statutes. Regulators mandated the widespread use
of codes of ethics that explicitly protect whistleblowers and implement
whistleblower hotlines. These important developments raised the public profile
and importance of whistleblowing as a law enforcement tool.
Despite these successes, however, Sarbanes-Oxley's greatest lesson derives
from its two most prominent failings, which I discuss in Part IV. First, over the
last decade, the Act simply did not protect whistleblowers who suffered
retaliation. Instead, government administrators and adjudicatory decision
makers undermined the Act's protections. Second, important whistleblower
disclosures in the last decade did not lead to effective efforts to address
underlying wrongdoing. The financial crisis in 2008 provides the most vivid
case study of this failure, as corporate officers, government regulators, and law
enforcement agencies ignored the warnings of employees who tried to report
problems in the subprime mortgage industry. These related failures indicate that
although whistleblowers have stronger and more prevalent protection than ever
before, they have less reason to believe such protection works. After a decade,
the Sarbanes-Oxley lesson may be that the usual approach to whistleblowing
may not be sufficient.
In Part V, I note that, encouragingly, developments in the last two years
demonstrate that policymakers may have learned from the Sarbanes-Oxley
experience. In addition to focusing on the substance of various statutory
protections, renewed energy has been put toward determining who is involved in
administering those protections. As a result, newly appointed whistleblower
advocates -in key government positions have begun to address the roadblocks
previously used to thwart the strong antiretaliation protection Congress initially
envisioned for the Act. Moreover, in 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 1 to address the failings that
preceded the most recent financial crisis. This Act applies a radically different
model to encourage whistleblowers by using financial rewards in addition to
Sarbanes-Oxley's more traditional approach. Ironically, the Act's two greatest
11. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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failings may provide its most lasting impact, as they prompted policymakers to
experiment with additional strategies to more effectively encourage
whistleblowers.
II. ENACTING SARBANES-OXLEY
During the Congressional hearings preceding Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment,
an internal accountant from Enron named Sherron Watkins gave crucial
testimony detailing the way in which the company manipulated its finances to
create the illusion of value.12 She also testified that she informed CEO Ken Lay
about the widespread financial improprieties, first through an anonymous letter
13and then in a personal meeting. When Andrew Fastow, Watkins's supervisor,
found out about the meeting, Fastow tried to fire her. 14 Moreover, the human
resources department asked its outside counsel for advice on whether Watkins
could be fired after reporting accounting fraud. 15 The advice from outside
counsel noted that neither Texas law (where Enron was headquartered) nor
federal statutes provided Watkins any protection. 16 Senators became outraged
when this letter became public, noting, "after this high level employee at Enron
reported improper accounting practices, Enron did not consider firing [Arthur]
Andersen [Enron's accountant]; rather, the company sought advice on the
legality of discharging the whistleblower."
' 17
As a result, Congress included expansive whistleblower provisions in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Senate Report on the legislation noted that "In
a variety of instances when corporate employees at both Enron and Andersen
attempted to report or 'blow the whistle' on fraud,... they were discouraged at
nearly every turn." 18 The Report also noted media accounts of several other
12. See The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 14-66 (2002)
[hereinafter Watkins Testimony] (testimony of Sherron Watkins).
13. See Leslie Griffin, Whistleblowing in the Business World, in ENRON: CORPORATE
FIASCOS, supra note 2, at 209, 209-11; Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 5, at 1123 n.64.
14. See Watkins Testimony, supra note 12, at 18-19.
15. See Email from Carl Jordan, Attorney, Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., to Sharon Butcher,
Assistant Gen. Counsel, Enron (Aug 24, 2001, 7:02 PM), available at http://www.justice.
gov/enron/exhibit/03- 15/BBC-0001/Images/98 10.001 .PDF.
16. See id Ultimately, Watkins requested a transfer and wound up in a job in human
resources. See Griffin, supra note 13, at 213-14.
17. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 5 (2002). At the same time, some employees of other companies
had more success blowing the whistle on corporate fraud. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra
note 5, at 1117-19. For example, Congressional testimony from WorldCom officers indicated that
Cynthia Cooper, an internal investigator, uncovered the fraud of WorldCom's Chief Financial
Officer and reported him to the company's Board of Directors. See Wrong Numbers: The
Accounting Problems at WorldCom: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 4, at
93-94, 129-30 (statements of Reps. Charles A. Gonzalez, Edward R. Royce, & Brad Sherman).
WorldCom's Board took a different approach than Enron and fired the wrongdoer rather than the
whistleblower. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 5, at 1117.
18. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 4-5.
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instances in which an employee attempted to report corporate misconduct, only
to face retaliation:
These examples further expose a culture, supported by law, that
discourage[s] employees from reporting fraudulent behavior not only to
the proper authorities, such as the FBI and the SEC, but even internally.
This 'corporate code of silence' not only hampers investigations, but
also creates a climate where ongoing wrongdoing can occur with virtual
impunity. The consequences of this corporate code of silence for
investors in publicly traded companies, in particular, and for the stock
market, in general, are serious and adverse, and they must be
remedied. 19
The Senate concluded that to encourage employees to come forward with
evidence of wrongdoing, the law needed to provide more robust protection from
retaliation:
[C]orporate whistleblowers are left unprotected under current law. This
is a significant deficiency because often, in complex fraud prosecutions,
these insiders are the only firsthand witnesses to the fraud. They are the
only people who can testify as to 'who knew what, and when,' crucial
questions not -only in the Enron matter but [also] in all complex
securities fraud investigations. Although current law protects many
government employees who act in the public interest by reporting
wrongdoing, there is no similar protection for employees of publicly
traded companies who blow the whistle on fraud and protect investors.
With one in every two Americans investing in public companies, this
distinction fails to serve the public good.2°
At the time, the Act's provisions contrasted sharply with the relatively weak
whistleblower protections then available to private-sector whistleblowers in the
United States. Federal whistleblower provisions typically covered only
employees in specific industries, often those related to health and safety, when
they reported violations of a specific statute containing an antiretaliation
22provision. These "silos" of protection aided the enforcement of a particular
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 10.
21. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 76-78.
22. See Private Sector Whistleblowers: Are There Sufficient Legal Protections?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Prots. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, II0th Cong. 2-3
(2007), available at http://law.unl.edu/sites/unl.edu.college-of-law.aw/files/facstaff/faculty/resident
/docs/moberlystatement.pdf (statement of Richard E. Moberly, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of
Neb. College of Law); Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L.
REv. 975, 981-83 (2008) [hereinafter Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers].
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statute, such as the Clean Air Act 23 or the Surface Transportation Assistance
Act,24 but did not address more far-reaching misconduct such as the fraud that
led to Enron-like scandals. If an employee reported corporate wrongdoing but
not the "right" type-wrongdoing covered by a particular statute with a
whistleblower provision-then federal law would not protect the employee from
retaliation.26
Moreover, less than half of the states had antiretaliation provisions for
private-sector employees. 27  These provisions obviously varied from state to
state, resulting in employees of nation-wide companies receiving different types
28of protection depending on their location. Additionally, almost all states
permitted whistleblowers to bring a tort claim for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy.29  However, the breadth of coverage varied
dramatically by state, and, because it was judge-made law, employees had
difficulty predicting the scope of the tort protection in any particular state ahead
of time. 3° After examining this landscape, Congress decided it needed to address
the "patchwork and vagaries" of state law to provide more consistent and far-
reaching protection for whistleblowers.3 1
Sarbanes-Oxley utilizes two different models to encourage whistleblowers.
First, and most traditionally, it contains an antiretaliation provision that provides
a right of action to employees of publicly traded companies who suffered
retaliation because they reported fraud.32  By applying nationwide, Congress
meant to address the confusion caused by state-specific provisions and to cover
employees of large companies equally, regardless of their location. 33 Further,
the Act's language appears to include a broad range of whistleblower disclosures
because it protects reports related to six types of fraud, including violations of
the broadly construed federal mail and wire fraud statutes. 34 Although it is a
23. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (2006).
24. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a) (2006).
25. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 76-77.
26. See Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers, supra note 22, at 982, 986.
27. See DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 77-78 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that seventeen states have statutes covering
private-sector whistleblowers, not including fair employment statutes similar to Title VII that
contain an antiretaliation provision).
28. See Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers, supra note 22, at 983.
29. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 27, at 95 (noting that forty jurisdictions permit
whistleblowers to bring a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy).
30. See Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers, supra note 22, at 983-86.
31. See S. REP. No. 107-146, at 10 (2002).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (2006).
33. See S. REP. No. 107-146, at 10.
34. The statute protects activity related to violations of §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire
fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), and 1348 (securities fraud) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, or "any rule or
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to
fraud against shareholders." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l), (a)(2). Reports can be made to a broad
range of recipients, including Congress, law enforcement agencies, and any person internally who
has supervisory authority over the employee. Id. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(C).
2012]
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"silo," because it does not protect all disclosures related to illegality (only the six
types of illegal conduct specifically listed in the Act), in 2002, it appeared to be a
very large silo. Not only did it protect, for the first time, disclosures related to
the types of fraud that led to the scandals, but it also potentially covered a great
deal more. Indeed, shortly after the Act's passage, whistleblower expert Robert
Vaughn argued for broadly interpreting the protected activity to include:
disclosures of misconduct as diverse as health and safety violations, the
suppression of information regarding product risks, environmental
misconduct, consumer fraud, false claims against the government,
disregard of statutes requiring the disclosure of information to federal
regulatory agencies, violations of federal anti-discrimination laws,
violations of statutes and rules protective of labor, conspiracies to break
the antitrust laws, bribery of public officials, including foreign officials,
and human rights abuses.
35
Additionally, because the Act adopted the burden of proof scheme from the
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century,36
also known as AIR21, Sarbanes-Oxley's burden of proof seemed more
employee-friendly than most whistleblower statutes.37 The employee must prove
that a protected activity-such as whistleblowing 38-was a "contributing factor"
in the retaliation suffered by the employee. 39 The Department of Labor and
academics c6nsider this standard easier for employees to meet than other types
of burdens, such as the "but for" causation standard typically required by tort law
and the "motivating factor" standard often applied in "mixed-motive"
discrimination cases. If the employee satisfies this burden, the employer's
burden becomes more difficult than normal. An employer can prevail only if it
proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same
35. Vaughn, supra note 3, at 23.
36. Pub. L. No. 106-181, § 519(a), 114 Stat. 61, 146-47 (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.). Sarbanes-Oxley provides that, with few exceptions, whistleblower actions "shall be
governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in § 42121 (b) of title 49, United States Code." 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C).
37. See Moberly, Unfulflled Expectations, supra note 5, at 78-80.
38. Protected activities also include assisting in an investigation or a proceeding related to a
covered violation or causing information to be provided to a supervisor, law enforcement, or
Congress about a covered violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
39. See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(b) (2011).
40. See, e.g., Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806
of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,104, 52,107 (Aug. 24, 2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1980)
[hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Procedures] (discussing the causation standard); TIMOTHY P. GLYNN
ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 224-25 (2007)
("Congress's use of 'contributing factor' in Sarbanes-Oxley suggests the same or perhaps even a
lower level of causation" than "motivating factor" causation.); Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations,
supra note 5, at 80 (comparing "contributing factor" causation to "mixed-motive" causation).
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adverse employment action even if the employee had not engaged in the
protected activity. 4
The Act also utilizes a unique procedural innovation that, in its ideal form,
combines the efficiency of an administrative investigation with the safeguards of
a federal court trial. Initially, a whistleblower must file a complaint of
retaliation with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
which investigates the claim.4 3 If OSHA substantiates the claim, then OSHA can
order a broad range of remedies, including reinstatement, back pay, and some
consequential damages, such as attorneys' fees. 4 Either party can appeal
OSHA's decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who would hold a de
novo evidentiary hearing. 45  The ALJ's decision can be appealed to the
Administrative Review Board (ARB) 46 and eventually to the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals.47 Unique among whistleblower statutes at the time, Sarbanes-
Oxley also permitted a whistleblower to withdraw the claim before the ARB's
final decision and to file a case for de novo review in federal district court.
48
The Act's combination of broad applicability, friendly burdens of proof, and
procedural protections led many scholars and advocates at the time to conclude
that Sarbanes-Oxley greatly improved whistleblower protections in the United
States.a9  Professor Vaughn called it "the most important whistleblower
protection law in the world," 50 and Professor Cynthia Estlund labeled it the "gold
standard" of whistleblower protection.51  Taxpayers Against Fraud called
41. See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(c).
42. The procedure was unique for whistleblower statutes. Discrimination claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 utilized a similar procedure by requiring an initial administrative
agency investigation before the law permitted a plaintiff to file a federal claim in district court. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006).
43. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.103(c), .104(b)(1). The Act actually assigns such claims to the
Secretary of Labor, who delegated the investigative process to OSHA's Assistant Secretary. See
Secretary's Order 5-2002, Delegation of Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to the
Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,008, 65,008 (Oct. 22,
2002).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.105(a)(1), (c).
45. See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.107(a)-(b).
46. See§ 1980.110.
47. See§ 1980.112(a).
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (permitting withdrawal and federal court filing if the
Secretary of Labor does not issue a final decision within 180 days); see also Vaughn, supra note 3,
at 87 ("This authorization for a whistleblower to commence a civil action in a federal district court
is new with the whistleblower provision and differs in this way from other whistleblower statutes
administered by the Department [of Labor]. Its novelty, however, attests to the importance that
Congress attached to it.").
49. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 68 & nn.8-9 (quoting responses
from academics, advocates, and the press). But see Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark?
Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment
Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2004) (concluding that Sarbanes-Oxley is a "half-measure and
not the true reform our securities laws need to respond to corporate fraud").
50. Vaughn, supra note 3, at 105.
51. Estlund, supra note 9, at 376.
2012]
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Sarbanes-Oxley "the single most -effective measure possible to prevent
recurrences of the Enron debacle and similar threats to the nation's financial
markets, 52 while Tom Devine of the Government Accountability Project, a
whistleblower advocacy group, described the Act as "the promised
land.... [T]he law represents a revolution in corporate freedom of speech [that]
far surpasses, indeed laps, the rights available for government workers."5 The
press fueled expectations as well. For example, in 2002, Business Week stated
that the Act "gives those who report corporate misconduct sweeping new legal
protection .... [W]histleblowers are going to find life a bit easier. 54 In short, in
2002, expectations for the Act were high.
In addition to using the traditional antiretaliation model to protect
whistleblowers after they report, the Act also includes what I have called a
"structural model" to alter corporate practices by "encouraging and supporting
whistleblowing before any disclosure is made." 55  Section 301 of Sarbanes-
Oxley 56 requires the board of directors of every publicly traded corporation to
"establish procedures for receiving complaints regarding accounting, internal
accounting controls, or auditing matters." Additionally, the audit committee of
each company's board of directors must be able to receive anonymous reports
from its employees about accounting or auditing matters.58 As I noted in 2006,
these provisions reflect two innovations. First, the disclosure avenues lead
"directly to independent directors on the board's audit committee-not to
corporate executives. 59  Second, the Act makes these disclosure channels
mandatory.
60
I predicted that these improvements "may produce more effective
disclosures from whistleblowing employees than prior attempts to encourage
whistleblowing because [Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural] Model addresses two
significant problems that previously kept employees from consistently
functioning as successful corporate monitors: (1) the corporate norm of silence,
52. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 10 (2002) (quoting letter from Moorman & Devine to Sen.
Leahy, supra note 9, at 1791).
53. Blowing the Whistle on Corporate Wrongdoing: An Interview with Tom Devine, supra
note 10; see also GREGORY R. WATCHMAN, SARBANES-OXLEY WHISTLEBLOWERS: A NEW
CORPORATE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM I, 8 (2004) (describing the Act as a "major breakthrough in
establishing whistleblower rights").
54. Paula Dwyer & Dan Carney, Year of the Whistleblower, Bus. WK., Dec. 16, 2002, at 107,
109; see also id. at 110 ("Corporate managers had better brace themselves.").
55. Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 5, at 1131; see also id. at 1109, 1131-41
(discussing the ineffectiveness of prior versions of the Structural Model and introducing Sarbanes-
Oxley's new model).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4) (2006).
57. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 5, at 1138 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(m)(4)(A)
(Supp. 2002)).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)(B).
59. Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 5, at 1110.
60. See id.
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and (2) the corporate tradition of blocking and filtering employee
whistleblowing." 61 In fact, I suggested that the structural model
is more likely than the Antiretaliation Model to reduce the flow-of-
information problems that contributed to recent corporate
scandals.... The Structural Model encourages more whistleblowing
because it provides incentives to increase employee participation as
corporate monitors and reduces various disincentives to employee
whistleblowing. Equally important, this direct channel to the board
should encourage effective whistleblowing by circumventing
information blocking and filtering by corporate executives. In this way,
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model minimizes the principal-agent
problem that arises when employees provide information about
misconduct to mid-level managers and corporate executives who cover-
up or ignore the fraud. Furthermore, the model should provide several
secondary benefits to corporations and their employees, such as
improving corporate decision-making, reducing monitoring costs, and
increasing employee voice within the corporation. Such benefits may
lead to greater acceptance and implementation than pre-scandal attempts
to encourage whistleblowers.
62
Finally, the Act requires corporations either to issue a code of ethics
63applicable to senior financial officers or to explain publicly its failure to do so.
Although this provision did not attract much attention from the whistleblower
community at the time of Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment, it would ultimately have
important consequences, which I detail below.
64
III. SUCCESSES
In many ways, Sarbanes-Oxley represents a great leap forward for
whistleblowers in the United States, and the Act served as the model for
subsequent reform. Indeed, in the decade after its enactment, legislatures and
regulators unleashed a torrent of formal encouragement for whistleblowers.
Federal and state governments passed an impressive array of broad
antiretaliation statutes and regulators mandated the widespread use of corporate
codes of ethics that explicitly protect whistleblowers and implement
whistleblower hotlines. As the most prominent example of reform during this
time, Sarbanes-Oxley should receive some credit for these developments.
61. See id. at 1109.
62. Id. atl 110-11.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (2006).
64. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
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At the federal level, Congress passed at least nine new antiretaliation
provisions during the last decade. 65 It also amended several other whistleblower
provisions to broaden their applicability. 66 Many of the new statutes utilize the
advanced substantive and procedural protections Sarbanes-Oxley made
prominent, such as the employee-friendly burden of proof67 and the broad
remedies of reinstatement, consequential damages, and attorneys' fees.68
Although each of the provisions contains its own "silo" of protected activity,
because they only protect certain types of whistleblower disclosures related to
the subject matter of the particular statute, the provisions consequently protect a
wide-range of behaviors, often including both internal and external reporting
69
and participation in investigations related to violations of the statute. 70
65. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, sec. 402, § 1012, 124
Stat. 3885, 3968 (2011) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 399d (Supp. IV 2010)); Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 748, § 23, 124 Stat. 1376, 1744
(2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 26 (Supp. IV 2010)); id. sec. 922, § 21F, 124 Stat. at 1841 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (Supp. IV 2010)); id. sec. 1057, 124 Stat. at 2031 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5567 (Supp. IV 2010)); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec.
1558, § 18C, 124 Stat. 119, 261 (2010) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 218C (Supp. IV 2010)); American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1533, 123 Stat. 115, 297 (2009)
(enacting antiretaliation protection for whistleblowing about misconduct related to stimulus funds);
Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, sec. 219, § 40, 122 Stat.
3016, 3062 (2008) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2087 (Supp. IV 2010)); Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1413, 121 Stat. 266,
414 (2007) (passing the National Transit Systems Security Act of 2007, which included
whistleblower protections) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 1142 (Supp. IV 2010)); Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, sec. 6, § 60129, 116 Stat. 2985, 2989 (2002)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 60129 (2006))
66. See Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-281, § 611, 124 Stat. 2905,
2969 (2010) (amending Seamen's Protection Act, 46 U.S.C. §2114 (Supp. IV 2010)); Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(d), 123 Stat. 1617, 1624-25
(2009) (amending False Claims Act whistleblower provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (Supp. IV
2010)); Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 419, 122 Stat. 4848, 4892-93
(2008) (amending the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109 (Supp. IV 2010));
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 sec. 1521, § 20109(a), 121
Stat. at 444-45 (2007) (amending the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109); id. § 1536,
121 Stat. at 464-65 (amending the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31105);
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 629, 119 Stat. 594, 785 (2005) (amending the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(2) (2006)).
67. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act sec. 402, § 1012(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 3969;
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1057(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 2033;
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act sec. 1558, § 18C(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 261; American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 1533(c)(1), 123 Stat. at 299-300; Consumer Product
Safety Improvement Act of 2008 sec. 219, § 40(b)(2)(B), 122 Stat. at 3063-64; Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, § 1413(c)(2)(B), 121 Stat. at 416-17;
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 sec. 6, § 60129(b)(2)(B), 116 Stat. at 2990-91.
68. See sources cited supra note 65.
69. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act sec. 402, § 1012(a), 124 Stat. at 3968; Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1057(a), 124 Stat. at 2031-32; Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act sec. 1558, § 18C(a), 124 Stat. at 261; American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 1533(a), 123 Stat. at 297; Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act
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Many of the new statutes also adopt the procedural innovation of requiring
an initial administrative investigation of a retaliation complaint, followed by
providing the whistleblower an opportunity for de novo review in federal district
court. 71  Indeed, Congress designated the Department of Labor (which
subsequently designated OSHA) as the initial administrative investigative
agency in eight antiretaliation statutes after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in
2002, 72 raising the total number of statutes under OSHA's whistleblower
umbrella from thirteen to twenty-one over the last decade.7 3
In addition to providing for new whistleblower protection, some federal
legislation in the last decade fixed older whistleblower provisions that provided
less than the best practices popularized by Sarbanes-Oxley. For example,
Congress amended the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 198274 and the
Federal Railroad Safety Act75 to make their procedures related to burden of
proof, remedies, and federal district court de novo review more in line with
Sarbanes-Oxley.76 Also, the Energy Policy Act of 200577 amended the Energy
of 2008 sec. 219, § 40(a), 122 Stat. at 3062-63; Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 § 1413(a), 121 Stat. at 414-15; Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002
sec. 6, § 60129(a), 116 Stat. at 2989-90.
70. See sources cited supra note 69; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act sec. 748, § 23(h)(l)(A), 124 Stat. at 1744; sec. 922, § 21F(h)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at
1845-46 ("providing information to the Commission" or "assisting in any investigation or judicial
or administrative action of the Commission").
71. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act sec. 402, § 1012(b)(4)(A), 124 Stat. at 3970;
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1057(c)(4)(D)(i), 124 Stat. at
2034; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act sec. 1558, § 18C(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 261;
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 1553(c)(1)(B)(3), 123 Stat. at 300 (the
Inspector General conducts the initial investigation); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of
2008 § 219(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3064; Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007 § 1413(c)(7), at 121 Stat. at 418.
72. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act sec. 402, § 1012(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 3968; Coast
Guard Authorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-281 § 611, 124 Stat. 2905, 2969-70 (2010)
(amending Seamen's Protection Act, 46 U.S.C. § 2114 (Supp. IV 2010)); Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1057(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 2032; Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act sec. 1558, § 18C(b)(l), 124 Stat. at 261 (incorporating procedure found at 15
U.S.C. § 2087(b)); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 sec. 219(a), § 40(b)(1), 122
Stat. at 3063; Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 sec.
1413(c)(2)(A), 121 Stat. at 416; id. sec. 1521, § 20109(c)(1), 121 Stat. at 446 (amending Federal
Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109 (2006) to require investigation by Secretary of Labor);
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 sec. 6(a), § 60129(b)(2), 116 Stat. at 2990.
73. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., The Whistleblower Protection Program,
http://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutespage.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (listing statutes under
OSHA's jurisdiction).
74. See49 U.S.C. § 31105 (Supp. IV2010).
75. See 49 U.S.C. § 20109 (Supp. IV 2010).
76. See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 sec. 1521,
§ 20109, 121 Stat. at 444; sec. 1536, 121 Stat. at 464-67; Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation
Complaints Under the Employee Protection Provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act
of 1982, 75 Fed. Reg. 53,544 (Aug. 31, 2010) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1978); Procedures for the
Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under the National Transit Systems Security Act and the
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Reorganization Act of 197478 to permit de novo review by a federal district court
if the Department of Labor has not completed review of a whistleblower's
complaint within one year.79 Finally, Congress expanded the scope of two older
whistleblower provisions to specify that they protected independent contractors
as well as employees in the same manner as Sarbanes-Oxley. 80 Although bits
and pieces of these reforms may have been found in laws predating Sarbanes-
Oxley's enactment in 2002, the Act brought all of them together and set the
benchmark for federal whistleblowing law during the decade after its passage.
Some of the statutes take Sarbanes-Oxley as a baseline and improve upon it.
The 2009 economic "stimulus bill," for example, gives specific examples of the
types of circumstantial evidence that an employee may use to satisfy the
"contributing factor" burden of proof, such as demonstrating temporal proximity
between the protected activity and the reprisal, or knowledge by the decision
maker of the protected activity. Many newer statutes add "refusing to engage
in unlawful conduct" as a protected activity. 82 Several statutes passed in the last
decade prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements from covering whistleblower
claims arising under the statute and also prohibit employees from waiving their
Federal Railroad Safety Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 53,522 (Aug. 31, 2010) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1982).
Interestingly, Congress has not spoken consistently regarding the type of procedure it thinks best for
whistleblowers. During the last decade, Congress also amended the Seaman's Protection Act to
remove the ability of a whistleblower to file a claim in federal district court and to add
administrative review by the Department of Labor. See Coast Guard Authorization Act § 61 1(b),
124 Stat. at 2969-70. In the same year, it provided for whistleblowers under two provisions in a
different statute to bring a retaliation claims directly in federal court. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 748, § 23(h)(l)(B), 124 Stat. at 1744; sec. 922,
§ 21F(h)(l)(B)(i), 124 Stat. at 1846.
77. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 629, 119 Stat. 594, 785 (2005).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 585 1(b)(4) (2006).
79. Energy Policy Act of 2005 sec. 629(b), § 211 (b), 119 Stat. at 785; see also Procedures for
the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under the Employee Protection Provisions of Six
Environmental Statutes and Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as Amended, 76
Fed. Reg. 2808, 2809 (Jan. 18, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 24) (stating that the August 2005
amendments added the de novo review provision in the event that the Secretary had not issued a
final ruling within one year of the complaint being filed).
80. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4(d),
§ 3730(h), 123 Stat. 1617, 1624-25 (2009) (amending False Claims Act whistleblower provision,
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), to apply to contractors and agents); Energy Policy Act of 2005 sec. 629,
§ 211 (a)(2), 119 Stat. at 785; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006)
(applying to the company and "any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such
company").
81. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 1533(c)(1)(A)(ii), 123 Stat. 115,299 (2009).
82. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, sec. 402, § 1012(a)(4),
124 Stat. 3885, 3968 (2011); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, sec. 1057(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 2031-32 (2010); Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1558, § 18C(a)(5), 124 Stat. 119, 261 (2010); Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1413(a)(2), 121 Stat.
266, 415 (2007); Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, sec. 6,
§ 60129(a)(l)(B), 116 Stat. 2985, 2989 (2002).
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rights under the antiretaliation provision.83  Also, several new whistleblower
provisions explicitly provide for jury trials as part of the de novo review in
federal court, something Sarbanes-Oxley's provision originally failed to do.
8 5
Similarly, Sarbanes-Oxley did not explicitly authorize federal courts to enforce
an OSHA order, an oversight not repeated in later statutes. 86 Moreover, new
statutes make clear that whistleblowers will be protected even if reporting
misconduct related to their job duties,87 a provision that became prudent after the
Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos8 g holding that the First
Amendment did not protect such "job-duty" whistleblowers. 89 All of the new
statutes provide more time for whistleblowers to file claims than Sarbanes-
Oxley's original ninety-day statute of limitations,90 and four provide enhanced
83. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 748, § 23(n), 124
Stat. at 1746; id sec. 1057(d), 124 Stat. at 2035; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
§ 1533(d), 123 Stat. at 301. Interestingly, one recent act prohibits employee waiver, but does not
mention pre-dispute arbitration agreements. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 402,
§ 1012(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 3971.
84. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act sec. 402, § 1012(b)(4)(A), 124 Stat. at 3970;
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 1057(c)(4)(D)(i), 124 Stat. at
2034; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act sec. 1558, § 18C(b), 124 Stat. at 261; American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 1533(c)(1)(B)(3), 123 Stat. at 300; Consumer Product
Safety Improvement Act of 2008 sec. 219, § 40(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3064; Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 § 1413(c)(7), 121 Stat. at 418; id sec.
1521, § 20109(c)(3), 121 Stat. at 446; id. § 1536(c), 121 Stat. at 466.
85. See Jarod S. Gonzalez, SOX Statutory Interpretation, and the Seventh Amendment:
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Whistleblower Claims and Jury Trials, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 25, 28-29
(2006).
86. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act sec. 402, § 1012(b)(6), 124 Stat. at 3971;
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 1057(c)(5), 124 Stat. at 2035;
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act sec. 1558, § 18C, 124 Stat. at 261; Consumer Product
Safety Improvement Act of 2008 sec. 219, §40(b)(6), 122 Stat. at 3065; Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 § 1413(c)(5), 121 Stat. at 418 (2007); id
sec. 1521, § 20109(c)(2)(A)(iii), 121 Stat. at 446.
87. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act sec. 402, § 1012(a), 124 Stat. at 3968; Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 1057(a), 124 Stat. at 2031; American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 1533(a), 123 Stat. at 297; Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act of 2008 sec. 219(a), § 40(a), 122 Stat. at 3062.
88. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
89. See id at 426 (holding that the First Amendment did not protect government employees
who speak about matters of public concern if the employee's statements were made pursuant to his
professional duties).
90. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act sec. 402, § 1012(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 3968 (180
days); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 748, § 23(h)(l)(B)(iii),
124 Stat. at 1744 (two years); id. sec. 922, § 21F(h)(1)(B)(iii)(1), 124 Stat. at 1846 (up to six years);
id. sec. 1057(c)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 2032 (180 days); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act sec.
1558, § 18C(b), 124 Stat. at 261 (180 days); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008
sec. 219(a) § 40(b)(1), 122 Stat. at 3063 (180 days); Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 sec. 1413(c)(1), 121 Stat. at 416 (180 days); id sec. 1521,
§ 20109(c)(2)(A)(ii), 121 Stat. at 446 (180 days); id. sec. 1536(b), § 31 105(b), 121 Stat. at 465 (180
days); Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 sec. 6, § 60129(b)(1), 116 Stat. at 2990 (180 days).
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remedies, such as double back pay damages9 1 or punitive damages. Further,
the Dodd-Frank Act amended the False Claims Act to prohibit associational
discrimination as retaliation.
93
Finally, in 2010, Congress fixed problems that had become apparent with
Sarbanes-Oxley itself. First, Sarbanes-Oxley's statute of limitations of ninety
days seemed unreasonably short.9 4 In fact, from 2002 to 2005, OSHA and ALJs
dismissed a large percentage of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases for failure
to comply with the statute of limitations. 95 Some cases missed the deadline by
mere days, often because of confusion regarding exactly when the limitations
period began to run. 96 The Dodd-Frank Act changed the limitations period to
180 days and clarified that the period began running "after the date on which the
employee became aware" of the retaliation.97  Second, ALJs and the ARB had
issued confusing decisions regarding whether Sarbanes-Oxley protected
employees of private subsidiaries of publicly traded companies. 98 Dodd-Frank
clarified that such employees should be protected from retaliation as
whistleblowers. 99  Third, Dodd-Frank amended Sarbanes-Oxley to prohibit
employee waivers and pre-dispute arbitration agreements related to Sarbanes-
Oxley's antiretaliation protection. 100 Fourth, Dodd-Frank clarified that de novo
91. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 922(a),
§ 21F(h)(1)(C)(ii), 124 Stat. at 1846.
92. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 sec. 1413(d)(3),
121 Stat. at 419 (2007); id. sec. 1521, §20109(d)(3), 121 Stat. at 447; id. sec. 1536,
§ 31105(b)(3)(C), 121 Stat. at 466 (all providing for award of up to $250,000 in punitive damages).
93. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 1079A,
§ 3301(c), 124 Stat. at 2079.
94. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 132-34.
95. See id. at 107-09 (describing results from study that found that 18.8% of OSHA cases
and 33.8% of.ALJ Sarbanes-Oxley cases during this time period were dismissed for failure to
comply with the statute of limitations).
96. See id.
97. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 922(c),
§ 1514A(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1848.
98. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 109-13. In 2011, the ARB noted
that "[s]ignificant conflicts have developed in the case law interpreting pre-amendment Section
806's coverage of subsidiaries. Department of Labor's ARB, its ALJs, and the federal courts have
been deeply divided over the subsidiary coverage issue under Section 806. Opinions have ranged
from near universal subsidiary coverage to no coverage for subsidiaries." Johnson v. Siemens Bldg.
Techs., Inc., ARB No. 08-032, ALJ No. 2005-SOX-015, at 10 (Dep't of Labor Mar. 31, 2011),
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARBDECISIONS/SOX/08_032
A.SOXP.PDF (listing various cases).
99. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 929A, § 1514A, 124
Stat. at 1852. Subsequently, the ARB determined that the Dodd-Frank provision, as a "clarifying
amendment," should be applied to cases pending on the Act's effective date. See Johnson, ARB
No. 08-032, at 16.
100. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 922(c), § 1514A(e),
124 Stat. at 1848.
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review of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim in federal district court included the right to a
jury trial. 10'
Political party did not seem to matter during this lawmaking spree, as both
Republican and Democratic presidents signed whistleblower laws.l2
Congresses with a variety of political compositions included such provisions in
important legislation. 0 3 Notably, all of President Obama's signature legislative
accomplishments-the economic stimulus bill, 10 4 health care reform, 0 5 and the
reform of the financial industry' 6-contained antiretaliation provisions.
10
7
Overall, it has been estimated that over sixty-five million employees have
received new antiretaliation protection from federal whistleblower provisions
passed since 2006.108
Arguably, Sarbanes-Oxley's influence went beyond federal law. One survey
of state law found that, since 2006, forty states have broadened or toughened
their whistleblower laws for public employees, while none have weakened
them.10 9 States have added protections for private employees as well. Since
Sarbanes-Oxley passed in 2002, twenty-two states have enacted thirty-five laws
that either created new whistleblower protections for private-sector employees or
strengthened existing statutory protections. 110
101. Id.
102. The federal government passed whistleblower provisions during the Presidency of
Republican George W. Bush-after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 through January 2009-
as well as during the Presidency of Democrat Barack Obama-from January 2009 to the time of this
Article's publication. See sources cited supra note 65 (providing dates of statutes containing
whistleblower provisions).
103. During the last decade, both Democrats and Republicans have, at various times,
controlled both the House of Representatives and the Senate. See Kathy E. Gill, Visual Guide: The
Balance of Power Between Congress and the Presidency (1945-2011), http://wiredpen.com/
resources/political-commentary-and-analysis/a-visua-guide-balance-of-power-congress-presideny/
(last visited Sept. 16, 2012).
104. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1533, 123
Stat. 115, 297-302 (2009).
105. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1558, § 18C,
124 Stat. 119, 261 (2010).
106. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 748, § 23, 124
Stat. at 1739-46 (2010); id sec. 922, § 21F, 124 Stat. at 1841-49; id sec. 1057, 124 Stat. at 2031-
35.
107. Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security
Dilemma, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 51, 66 (2012); see also id. at 66-71 (detailing the
whistleblower protections in each piece of legislation).
108. Maria Chutchian, Rise in Whistleblower Protections Inspires New Firm Practices,
LAW360 (June 1, 2012, 10:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/employment/articles/344005/rise-in-
whistleblower-protections-inspires-new-firm-practices (quoting a statement by Government
Accountability Project President Louis Clark).
109. Press Release, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, States Strengthening
Their Whistleblower Laws (Aug. 17, 2011), available at http://www.peer.org/news/news-id.
php?row id=1513.
110. See ALASKA STAT. § 08.68.279 (2010) (enacted 2002); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West
2011) (amended 2003); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1278.5 (West 2008) (amended 2007);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1336 (West 2005) (enacted 2003 and amended 2004); DEL. CODE
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Additionally, the corporate hotlines required by Sarbanes-Oxley have
become commonplace in corporate America. One recent study found that
approximately 80% of companies have whistleblower hotlines that employees
can use to report misconduct.Ill In 2010, a KPMG study found that 87% of U.S.
companies have in place "whistleblower mechanisms," such as a hotline or an
ombudsman. 12 This number increased from 75% in KPMG's 2008 survey. 13
Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley influenced the development of corporate codes of
ethics containing formal whistleblower protection. These code provisions grew
out of Sarbanes-Oxley's mandate that each publicly traded company disclose
whether it had a code of ethics applicable to its senior financial officers and, if it
did not have one, to publicly explain why it did not. l l 4 As a co-author and I
described elsewhere, after Sarbanes-Oxley implemented this code of ethics
requirement,
ANN. tit. 19 § 1701 (West 2005) (enacted 2004); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 174/1 (West 2010)
(enacted 2003 and amended 2008); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 130/1 lb (West 2008) (amended 2006);
210 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 86/35 (West 2008) (enacted 2004 and amended 2007); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39:2163 (Supp. 2012) (enacted 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, § 3A (West Supp.
2012) (amended 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932 (West Supp. 2012) (amended 2007); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 191.908 (West 2011) (enacted 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 198.301 (West 2004)
(enacted 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275-E:l-E:3 (LexisNexis 2008) (amended 2008); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1-19-14 (West 2011) (amended 2006); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney
Supp. 2012) (amended 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-240-243 (2011) (amended 2009); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4113.51-52 (LexisNexis 2007) (amended 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4723.33
(LexisNexis 2006) (amended 2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.885 (2011) (amended 2011); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 654.062 (2011) (amended 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-15-520 (Supp. 2011)
(amended 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-11-17.1 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2011); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 60-12-21 (2011) (amended 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 2011) (amended
2011); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 411.081-082 (West 2006) (amended 2005); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 411.084 (West 2006) (enacted 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 495 (2009) (amended 2007); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 507-509 (2009) (enacted 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.2:2 (Supp. 2012)
(amended 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.17.160 (West Supp. 2012) (amended 2010); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.210 (West Supp. 2012) (amended 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.230 (West Supp. 2012) (amended 2008).
111. See ETHICS RES. CTR., 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 48 (2011), available
at http://www.ethics.org/nbes/files/FinaINBES-web.pdf. Another study provided some indication
that hotlines were not as prevalent as indicated by the Ethics Resource Center study. Moberly and
Wylie examined corporate codes of ethics in 2007 and found that only 47.2% of the codes
instructed employees to report misconduct to a hotline. See Richard Moberly & Lindsey E. Wylie,
An Empirical Study of Whistleblower Policies in United States Corporate Codes of Ethics, in
WHISTLEBLOWING AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 27, 35 (David Lewis & Wim Vandekerckhove eds.,
2011), available at http://whistleblowers.dk/ArkivPDF/whistleblowing and democraticvalues_
3rdjan(l).pdf. However, this statistic may understate the use of hotlines, as companies may use a
hotline without mentioning it in their code of ethics. See id




114. See 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (2006).
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the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued regulations
under the Act that expanded upon these baseline statutory requirements
in three significant ways. First, companies must disclose Codes
applying to principal executive officers as well as to senior financial
officers. Second, the regulations expanded Sarbanes-Oxley's definition
of 'Code of Ethics' to include written standards that promote the
'prompt internal reporting of violations of the code to an appropriate
person or persons identified in the code.' Third, companies must
provide their Codes of Ethics to the public in one of three ways: as an
exhibit to its publicly available annual report, by posting it on its
website, or by providing a copy without charge to any person requesting
it.
The SEC also asked the U.S. stock exchanges to evaluate their
listing standards related to corporate governance. In response, three of
the largest stock exchanges issued new listing standards that, among
other things, made new requirements of listed companies related to
whistleblowing policies and Codes of Ethics ....
[For example, t]he New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) now
requires its listed companies to issue a Code of Ethics that applies to all
its directors, officers, and employees-a significant change from
Sarbanes-Oxley's application of Codes t6 senior financial officers. The
NYSE also states that corporate Codes should 'encourage' good faith
reporting of 'violations of laws, rules, regulations or the code of
business conduct' to 'supervisors, managers or other appropriate
personnel.' ... Codes also should encourage reports when an employee
is 'in doubt about the best course of action in a particular situation.'
With regard to protections for whistleblowers, the NYSE requires that
the 'company must ensure that employees know that the company will
not allow retaliation.' NYSE companies must make the Code of Ethics
available on the company's website or in print to any shareholder who
requests it.115
Our empirical study of corporate codes of ethics found that companies
comply with these statutory and regulatory requirements by explicitly promising
employees that the company will not retaliate against them for reporting
misconduct. 1" 6 In fact, these codes often provide broader promises to protect
their employees from retaliation than provided by statutory provisions or tort
115. Moberly & Wylie, supra note 11l, at 29-30 (internal citations omitted) (citing 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.406 (2011); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.10
(amended Nov. 25, 2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.con/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp
?selectednode=chp%5F 1%5F4%5F3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2FLcm%2Dsections%2F).
116. See id at 54 tbl.7 (reporting that 91% of company corporate codes in the study promised
"no retaliation" against employees or explicitly prohibited retaliation).
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claims." I7 For example, corporate codes of ethics typically protect employees
who report a broad range of wrongdoing, from illegal behavior generally (76.4%
of codes include this protection) to violations of the code itself (93.3%) to even
"unethical or improper" conduct (52.8%). 1 18 These promises not to retaliate
usually apply to all employees in the company, which could provide for more
consistent protection than the nuanced whistleblower laws that vary from state to
state. 119  Importantly, employees should not have difficulty finding these
corporate non-retaliation promises: over 85% of the codes in the study could be
found on corporate websites.'
20
Sarbanes-Oxley influenced the development of these formal statutory,
regulatory, and corporate provisions. I use the term "formal" because they exist
for all to see and for whistleblowers to rely upon and enforce.' Their presence
could encourage employees to blow the whistle, while also protecting employees
from retaliation. As formal statements of policy, the provisions also have the
symbolic effect of conveying the importance of whistleblowing to society's law
enforcement efforts. 22 They demonstrate that insiders can, and should, monitor
organizations on behalf of the public. Moreover, they communicate that
retaliation against whistleblowers should not be tolerated. Organizations and
government agencies altered their policies and procedures to comply with
Sarbanes-Oxley, and this too sends a message to employees about the
importance of reporting misconduct.
At the same time, the Act had significant impact as a symbol of the
importance of whistleblowing for organizational governance. The culture
around whistleblowing has changed in the last decade, making it more
acceptable and formally encouraged. 123  It is somewhat unclear what role
117. See id. at 32-43.
118. See id. at 40.
119. See id. at 41-42.
120. See id. at 50 tbl.1. Notably, the 2010 KPMG survey found that 100% of U.S. companies
distributed their anti-bribery and corruption policies-which often include formal whistleblower
provisions-to all employees. See KPMG, supra note 112, at 12.
121. See Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers, supra note 22, at 1021-38 (arguing for the
enforceability of antiretaliation promises made in corporate codes of ethics).
122. See, e.g., Peter Roberts, Evaluating Agency Responses: The Comprehensiveness and
Impact of Whistleblowing Procedures, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR
233, 239 (A.J. Brown ed., 2008), available at http://epress.anu.edu.au/anzsog/whistleblowing/
pdf/whole book.pdf ("Whistleblowing legislation appears to do at least one thing for which it was
intended: it increases employees' expectations that they will be taken seriously and will be protected
if they blow the whistle."); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV
943, 956-61 (1995) (citations omitted) (discussing the uses and force of social meaning); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2051 (1996) ("There can be
no doubt that law, like action in general, has an expressive function.").
123. See, e.g., Charles Bame-Aldred et al., An Examination of the Effectiveness of Sarbanes-
Oxley Whistle-Blower Protection, 8 J. FORENSIC ACCT. 105, 109 (2007) (noting that the "high-
profile" Enron and WorldCom whistleblowers "may herald a shift in social attitudes regarding the
protection of whistle-blowers"); Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K.,
and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 879, 880 (2004)
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Sarbanes-Oxley has played in this transformation-did Sarbanes-Oxley bring
whistleblowing into public prominence, or is it merely the most prominent
marker in whistleblowing's increased prominence over the last decade? In other
words, has Sarbanes-Oxley caused the rise or is it merely correlative? Although
the answer is probably somewhere in-between those extremes, I argue that, at a
minimum, Sarbanes-Oxley paved the way for the law to utilize formal
mechanisms that encourage whistleblowing.
As important as these symbolic and communicative effects might be, we
should also examine the specific question of whether such formal provisions
related to whistleblowers actually work. Unfortunately, although Sarbanes-
Oxley spawned a multitude of antiretaliation provisions aimed at assisting
whistleblowers, the last ten years of whistleblowing under Sarbanes-Oxley
teaches that they do not work as well as we might have hoped. The next section
explains why.
V. FAILURES
Scholars typically ask three questions to evaluate whether a whistleblowing
law works. First, does the law encourage employees to report misconduct?
Second, does the law protect them from retaliation if they do report? Third, if
they do report, are whistleblowers effective at stopping the misconduct-in other
words, are whistleblower reports "properly assessed and, where necessary,
investigated and actioned"?
124
To answer these questions definitively, scholars need to conduct more
empirical research in the United States. 125 One model that U.S. scholars could
follow, and that was used with great success in Australia, consists of the
scholarly examination of whistleblowing and compliance systems in dozens of.- 126
public-sector agencies from a variety of perspectives. In Australia, they
("Today, Congress and state legislatures in the United States embrace whistleblowing as an
important tool in the fight against misuse of public funds, abuse of power, and other types of
wrongdoing."); Chutchian, supra note 108 ("There's been a change in the acceptance of
whistleblowers that started with [the financial misconduct on] Wall Street.") (quoting Gordon
Schnell of Constantine Cannon).
124. See A.J. Brown et al., Best-Practice Whistleblowing Legislation for the Public Sector:
The Key Principles, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 122, at
261, 263; cf MARCIA P. MICELI ET AL., WHISTLE-BLOWING N ORGANIZATIONS 4 (Arthur P. Brief
et al. eds., 2008) (focusing on "evidence of the extensiveness of (a) the wrongdoing whistle-blowers
say they have witnessed; (b) whistle-blowing; (c) the retaliation whistle-blowers believe they
experience; and (d) the effectiveness of whistle-blowing").
125. In particular, the question of how to measure a whistleblower's effectiveness remains
difficult to resolve because of issues related to when to measure the whistleblower's effectiveness
and from whose perspective the effectiveness should be measured. See MICELI ET AL., supra note
124, at 16-18.
126. See A.J. Brown & Marika Donkin, Introduction, in WFIISTLEBLOWING N THE
AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 122, at 1, 4-8 (describing the "Whistling While They
Work" project).
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surveyed employees, supervisors, and organizational leaders, examined
documents related to compliance systems, and also conducted in-depth
interviews with dozens of workers and managers.127 Nothing completed in the
United States private sector matches the analytical depth of the Australian
study.128 Moreover, the studies that have been completed in the U.S. often offer
contradictory and inconsistent results concerning the incidence of
whistleblowing in the general employee population, the amount of retaliation
that occurs, and the overall effectiveness of whistleblowers at stopping the
wrongdoing they report.
1 29
However, the empirical evidence that does exist suggests that Sarbanes-
Oxley failed to meet at least two of the three key principles outlined above.
Although some evidence indicates that employees may report wrongdoing in
larger numbers than ever before, I argue below that the Act failed to protect
whistleblowers from retaliation and also failed to effectively address the
underlying wrongdoing being disclosed.
Moreover, as I explain in more detail below, evidence related to the financial
crisis in 2008 may be able to supplement the empirical record. Although a full
explanation of the crisis is beyond the scope of this Article, 130 one aspect of the
problem involved banks and other lenders providing subprime mortgages to
borrowers with questionable ability to pay them back and then bundling the
127. See id.
128. Several studies have been conducted related to public-sector whistleblowing that use
similar methods as the Australian study. See, e.g., U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., BLOWING THE
WHISTLE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 1980 AND 1983 SURVEY
FINDINGS 4 (1984) (outlining study design); U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., WHISTLEBLOWING AND
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE: BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON FRAUD, WASTE, AND MISMANAGEMENT-
WHO DOES IT AND WHAT HAPPENS 8 (1981) (discussing questionnaire sent to federal employees).
Other studies have taken samples from various private-sector organizations, but none of them have
matched the depth and comprehensiveness of the Australian study. See, e.g., Joyce Rothschild &
*Terance D. Miethe, Whistle-Blower Disclosures and Management Retaliation: The Battle to
Control Information About Organization Corruption, 26 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 107, 107-28
(1999) ("We needed to survey whistle-blowers from all walks of life and from every region of the
country to yield the validity we sought. We needed to interview them in considerable depth so that
we would be able to draw richly grained conclusions about the meaning of this phenomenon.").
Moreover, these studies do not cover the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period.
129. See MICELI ET AL., supra note 124, at 18-32.
130. For good explanations of the complicated back story to the recession beginning in 2007,
see BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010); PAUL MUOLO & MATHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: How WALL
STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS (2008); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME
SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
(2008); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS-AND THEMSELVES
(2009); and Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549
(2009).
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mortgages and selling them as "mortgage-backed securities."13 1 As borrowers
began defaulting on these mortgages, the value of these securities-and the
companies that invested heavily in them, such as Lehman Brothers, or that
guaranteed them, such as AIG-plummeted. 132 Some companies, like Lehman
Brothers, went bankrupt. 33 Others, like AIG, received massive federal bailout
loans. 134 Billions of dollars of shareholder value disappeared, and money for
loans to businesses and individuals dried up.'
35 Recession quickly followed.1
36
Importantly for this Article, allegations surfaced that lenders who provided
the subprime mortgages engaged in massive fraud in order to sell more loans and
convince regulators that the borrowers were qualified. 137 This alleged fraud built
up the real estate bubble and then contributed to the recession after the bubble
burst. Whistleblowers who detected and reported this fraud provide some insight
into whether Sarbanes-Oxley satisfied the three indicia of an effective
whistleblowing law.
A. Encouraging Disclosures
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment in 2002, various studies had found
substantial variance in the incidence of reporting wrongdoing by employees who
had observed it. As three prominent whistleblower scholars summarized in
2008:
In 1992, the most recent systematic survey of federal employees,
approximately 48% of observers blew the whistle. In a subsequent
survey of federal employees, 1,280 reported being the victim of sexual
harassment, but only 67 (about 4%) blew the whistle. In 1997, only
26% of the observers of wrongdoing at a large military base blew the
whistle; this sample was composed of about half military and half
civilian employees. Among directors of internal auditing-whose job it
is to ferret out and report financial wrongdoing internally in their
131. See Vanessa Castellina, Note, The New Financial Incentives and Expanded Anti-
Retaliation Protections for Whistleblowers Created by Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act: Actual
Progress or Just Politics?, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 187, 197 (2011).
132. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xvi
(2011).
133. See id. at 23.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 390.
136. See id.
137. See Castellina, supra note 131, at 198 ("[D]uring this most recent recession, many frauds
were revealed.").
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organization-about 90% of those who observed wrongdoing reported
it. 38
None of these studies, however, apply directly to private-sector employees
reporting corporate misconduct. Either they examine government or military
employees, or they focus on auditors, "whose jobs legitimate and even require
whistle-blowing" in a way that typical employee roles do not.
139
However, some relevant empirical evidence since 2002 does exist. The
Ethics Resource Center (ERC) has conducted a survey of private-sector
employees regularly since 1994. 14 In 2011, the ERC reported that 65% of the
employees who claimed they observed misconduct also asserted that they
reported it. 14 1 This result marked the highest disclosure rate in the seventeen-
year history of the survey, an increase of twelve percentage points from a record
low of 53% in 2005.142 Interestingly, however, in 2003 the ERC reported that
64% of employees disclosed misconduct they observed, meaning that
immediately after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, employees started reporting
less. 143 Since 2005, however, the percentage of employees reporting has risen
consistently. 144 The ERC assigns some of the credit for this increase in reporting
to an increase in "corporate ethics and compliance programs," which is changing
the behavior of employees for the better. 14 5 As the ERC notes, "in companies
with strong ethics programs, more than four out of five employees (83%) who
observed misconduct later reported it.' 146  These results would suggest that
Sarbanes-Oxley, which clearly enhanced the need for corporate compliance
systems, has had some impact on employee willingness to blow the whistle.
Yet, other evidence indicatesthat Sarbanes-Oxley's influence may not be as
robust. For example, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)
conducted surveys in both 2002 and 2010 regarding the source of fraud
detection. 47 Although employees were the largest source of reporting fraud in
138. MICELI ET AL., supra note 124, at 22-23 (internal citations omitted) (citing Jeong-Yeon
Lee et al., Blowing the Whistle on Sexual Harassment: Test of a Model of Predictors and Outcomes,
57 HuM. REL. 297 (2004); Marcia P. Miceli et al., Can Laws Protect Whistle-Blowers?, 26 WORK
AND OCCUPATIONS 129 (1999); Marcia P. Miceli et al., Who Blows the Whistle and Why?, 45
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 113 (1991) [hereinafter Miceli et al., Who Blows the Whistle]; Janet P.
Near et al., Does Type of Wrongdoing Affect the Whistle-Blowing Process?, 14 BUS. ETHICS Q. 219
(2004)).
139. Id. at 23.
140. See ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 111, at 8.
141. See id. at 12.
142. See id.




147. See ASS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM'RS, REPORT TO NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL
FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2010 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 16 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 REPORT TO
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both surveys, their importance relative to other sources (such as government
regulators, auditors, or competitors) did not change and actually appeared to
decrease over time. 148 A 2011 KPMG survey found a lower number of
employees who reported (10%), but also found that anonymous tipsters reported
about 14% of all fraud149-making the overall numbers similar to the ACFE
statistics. Another study examined U.S. fraud cases from 1996 to 2004 and
150
found that employees reported the fraud 17% of the time it became public -
again more than any other source. However, this study compared cases before
and after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed. It found that the percentage of employee
tips actually decreased after Sarbanes-Oxley.1 51 The authors speculated that
[o]ne possible explanation is that rules that strengthen the protection of
the whistleblowers' current jobs offer only a small reward relative to the
extensive ostracism whistleblowers face. Additionally, just because
jobs are protected does not mean that career advancements in the firm
are not impacted by whistleblowing. Another explanation could be that
job protection is of no use if the firm goes bankrupt after the revelation
of fraud. 
152
Some researchers also have conducted experiments with hypothetical
scenarios involving the willingness of financial services professionals to report
misconduct, with some participants ignorant of Sarbanes-Oxley's protections
and other participants being provided information about potential legal
protection. 15 They found that participants with knowledge of Sarbanes-Oxley's
whistleblower protections stated they would report potential accounting fraud far
more frequently than those without the information, even if the scenario made
retaliation likely.1 4 In other words, knowledge of Sarbanes-Oxley's protection
affected whether an individual would blow the whistle in the face of retaliation,
indicating that the Act could increase an employee's willingness to report
misconduct. 15
5
NATIONS]; ASS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM'RS, 2002 REPORT TO THE NATION ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 11 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 REPORT TO NATIONS].
148. See 2010 REPORT TO NATIONS, supra note 147, at 16-20 (reporting that tips initially
detected 37.8% of occupation fraud in the U.S. and that, worldwide, 40.2% of reported fraud was
detected by tips, and employees consisted of 49.2% of the tips); 2002 REPORT TO NATIONS, supra
note 147, at 11 (reporting that employees were the source of a report about fraud 26.3% of the
time). In other words, the 2010 report indicated that employees were the source of the fraud
disclosure about 20% of the time, down 6% from 2002.
149. See KPMG, WHO IS THE TYPICAL FRAUDSTER? 10 (2011).
150. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213,
2213-14 (2010).
151. See id at 2250-5l.
152. Id.
153. See Bame-Aldred et al., supra note 123, at 110-12.
154. See id at 114-15.
155. See id at 115-16.
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Thus, the statistical evidence presents an incomplete and somewhat
inconsistent picture. On the one hand, the ERC survey and the hypothetical
experiments indicate that Sarbanes-Oxley-influenced compliance systems may
be encouraging employees to report misconduct more frequently. On the other
hand, employees seemingly have not increased as a source of reporting
fraudulent conduct relative to other sources over the last decade. None of these
studies provide the precise answer to the question of whether the Act itself
encouraged more or less reporting of misconduct. We simply need more
empirical evidence to definitively conclude that Sarbanes-Oxley has played a
role in encouraging employee reporting behavior.
The financial crisis I mentioned above provides some interesting evidence to
consider. Recently, numerous media outlets highlighted employee attempts to
report rampant fraud in the subprime mortgage industry prior to 2008. For
example, Eileen Foster, a former executive vice president in charge of fraud
investigations for Countrywide Financial, and at least thirty other Countrywide
employees, claim that they told numerous officers at Countrywide 'about
systemic fraud within the company, which, at the time, was the country's leading
mortgage lender.1 56 The press also publicized the whistleblowing of Richard
Bowen, a former Citigroup vice president, who claims to have informed
Citigroup's officers and directors about massive fraud in the mortgage loan
division of the company.157
Employees at other companies involved in the mortgage debacle, like
Lehman Brothers,158 General Electric,159 Wells Fargo,16 Ameriquest, and
156. See Harry Bradford, Forner Countrywide Whistleblower: Mortgage Fraud 'Systemic,'
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2011, 2:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/05/countrywide-
whistleblower-mortgage-fraud-systemic n_1 129637.html#s516916&title=BofAForecloses On; Michael
Hudson, Countrywide Protected Fraudsters by Silencing Whistleblowers, Say Former Employees,
CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 22, 2011, 7:30 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/09/22/668
7/countrywide-protected-fraudsters-silencing-whistleblowers-say-former-employees; 60 Minutes:
Prosecuting Wall Street (CBS television broadcast Dec. 4, 2011) [hereinafter 60 Minutes], available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301- 18560_162-57336042/prosecuting-wall-street/?tag
=currentVideolnfo;videoMetalnfo.
157. See Dave Lieber, Blowing the Whistle on the Federal Government, STAR-TELEGRAM,
Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.star-telegram.com/2012/02/09/3724513/blowing-the-whistle-on-the-
federal.html#storylink=cpy (quoting Richard Bowen) ("'I sent e-mails. I gave weekly reports. I
made presentations. I started yelling. Yet through 2006 and 2007, the volumes [of purchases]
increased, and the rate of defective mortgages increased' in his division to as high as 80 percent.");
60 Minutes, supra note 156.
158. See M. Thomas Arnold, "It's Deji Vu All Over Again": Using Bounty Hunters to
Leverage Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419, 448 (2010) (citing Michael Corkery, Insider
Warned About Lehman Accounting, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703447104575118122594094284.html; Sakthi Prasad, Lehman Brothers'
Whistle Blower Was Ousted: Report, REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2010, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62FOXP20100316).
159. See Michael Hudson, Fraud and Folly: The Untold Story of General Electric's Subprime
Debacle, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 6, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.
org/2012/01/06/7802/fraud-and-folly-untold-story-general-electric-s-subprime-debacle.
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Washington Mutual, 162 also claim to have repeatedly told company officials
about massive fraud that ultimately resulted in billions of dollars in losses. In
fact, one investigative reporter-an author of a book about the crisis 63-
published an award-winning series of articles describing interviews with
whistleblowers he found by scouring administrative records and court filings for
retaliation claims against mortgage companies and banks.' 64 He located over
sixty employees from twenty different financial institutions who tell similar
stories about reporting massive mortgage fraud within their companies.
65
Such anecdotes arguably indicate that, at least with regard to the largest
example of corporate misconduct since Enron and WorldCom, employees
performed the job Sarbanes-Oxley envisioned for them as part of the corporate
monitoring system. Broader evidence of whether employees report more
frequently after Sarbanes-Oxley is, at best, inconclusive.
B. Protecting Whistleblowers from Retaliation
Unfortunately, even if Sarbanes-Oxley encouraged employees to report more
frequently, the Act often failed to protect them from reprisals and failed to
compensate them consistently for the retaliation they suffered.
The empirical evidence for these failures derives most immediately from
examining the outcomes of Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation cases filed with OSHA,
which I detail below. Before discussing this evidence, however, I should explain
the existing empirical evidence related to the incidence of retaliation found in
more general surveys. Even before 2002, whistleblower scholars noted the
wide-ranging estimates of how often retaliation occurs.' 6 6  For example, one
1991 study concluded that only 6% of internal auditors suffered reprisals, while
others "indicated that huge majorities" of whistleblowers felt retaliated
against. 167  These differences could have resulted from methodological
differences in the studies--some were non-random samples of whistleblowers,
160. See Michael Hudson, Whistleblowers Ignored, Punished by Lenders, Dozens of Former




162. See Michael Hudson, Ex-WaMu Worker Claims He Was Shunned for Refusing to Push
Toxic Loans on Borrowers, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 22, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.
publicintegrity.org/2 011/12/22/775 1 /ex-wamu-worker-claims-he-was-shunned-refusing-push-toxic-
loans-borrowers.
163. See MICHAEL W. HUDSON, THE MONSTER: HOW A GANG OF PREDATORY LENDERS AND
WALL STREET BANKERS FLEECED AMERICA-AND SPAWNED A GLOBAL CRISIS (2010).
164. See Hudson, supra note 160. The series was selected to appear in Columbia University
Press's Best Business Writing 2012 and also won a "Best-in-Business" Award from the Society of
American Business Editors and Writers. Id.
165. See id.
166. See MICELI ET AL., supra note 124, at 23-25 (citations omitted).
167. Id. (citing Miceli et al., Who Blows the Whistle, supra note 138, at 113).
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while others were random samples of employees in various workplaces--or from
a variance in factors such as organizational norms or legal protections from
retaliation.'
68
More recent studies mirror these variances. The ERC survey mentioned
above found a sharp increase between 2007 and 2011 in the percentage of
employees who reported retaliation after they disclosed misconduct, from 12%
to an "all-time high" of 22%.169 By contrast, the study of fraud cases between
1996 and 2004 determined that 82% of the employee whistleblowers suffered
retaliation. 1
70
Given the lack of consistent survey evidence, one way to examine whether
Sarbanes-Oxley's antiretaliation protection worked is to look at how often
employees won retaliation claims they filed with OSHA. Of course, the OSHA
win rate does not reflect how many employees reported misconduct and did not
suffer retaliation-these employees would not file claims and we would not
know about them.1 71 A greater problem might be that win rates are notoriously
difficult to interpret. 172 After all, what should the proper win rate be for a claim?
That question might be difficult to answer because the "ideal" win rate depends,
in part, upon the number of meritorious claims filed, which is likely impossible
to reasonably determine. 173
However, in this case, examining OSHA win rates does provide some sense
of whether Sarbanes-Oxley's statutory protections appropriately compensated
victims of retaliation because the statistics are so skewed against whistleblowers.
In 2007, I published an extensive empirical study of OSHA decisions in
Sarbanes-Oxley cases.1 74 I found that 3.6% of all claimants won after an OSHA
investigation-a paltry amount and lower than almost any other comparable
statute. 7 5 To put that in real numbers, by July 13, 2005 (almost exactly three
full years after Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment), OSHA issued 361 Sarbanes-Oxley
decisions and thirteen claimants won. P6 While these numbers seem low, the
numbers have been even worse for whistleblowers since the study ended. From
that point until December 31, 2011, more than six years later, only ten more
168. See id at 25.
169. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 111, at 15.
170. See Dyck et al., supra note 150, at 2240 (noting that these employees were "fired, quit
under duress, or had significantly altered responsibilities").
171. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 99 & n. 149.
172. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581,
588-89 (1998).
173. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 99.
174. See generally id. at 83-90 (describing study methodology).
175. See id. at 91-95. This win rate did not include cases that settled before OSHA reached a
decision. See id. at 95.
176. Seeid. at 91.
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whistleblowers won a case in front of OSHA."' In total, from the Act's
effective date until the end of 2011, employees won 1.8% of the 1,260 cases
OSHA decided."' Remarkably, for three straight years between fiscal years
2006 and 2008, OSHA did not decide a single case in favor of a Sarbanes-Oxley
claimant.179  During that time, OSHA found for employers in 488 straight
decisions. 80
Two primary factors contributed to the difficulties whistleblowers had
winning cases: administrative recalcitrance and adjudicative hamstringing.
1. Administrative Recalcitrance
When I examined OSHA whistleblower decisions in 2007, 1 found that the
low win rate for Sarbanes-Oxley claimants resulted, in part, from OSHA
investigators improperly applying Sarbanes-Oxley's favorable burden of proof to
the claimant's detriment.' 81  At the time, the OSHA Whistleblower
Investigations Manual did not accurately reflect the Sarbanes-Oxley burden
shifting, and I speculated that OSHA's procedures simply had not caught up with
the new law. Moreover, I believed that OSHA investigators were
overwhelmed with the law because of the influx of hundreds of new cases
without a corresponding increase in personnel.' s3 Others questioned whether
OSHA had the expertise to investigate Sarbanes-Oxley cases because of the
complexity of financial fraud compared with other laws under OSHA's mandate,
such as those related to worker safety.
184
In 2009 and 2010, these conclusions received some support from two
independent audits of OSHA's whistleblower program by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO).18 5  These audits found that OSHA lacked
177. See Letter from Sandra M. Dillon, Dir., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of the Whistleblower
Prot. Program, to author (Apr. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Dillon Letter] (on file with author).
178. Email from Diana Petterson, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of Pub. Affairs, to Michael
Hudson, Staff Writer, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity (undated) [hereinafter Petterson Email] (on file with
author). See generally Dillon Letter, supra note 177 (providing statistical data, for fiscal years
2005-2012, on the number of complaints filed under all of the statutes OSHA enforces). Again,
these statistics do not include settled cases. During this time period, 318 cases settled before OSHA
issued a decision. See Petterson Email, supra.
179. See Petterson Email, supra note 178.
180. See id.
181. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 120-28.
182. See id. at 125-26.
183. See id. at 124-25.
184. See Sarbanes-Oxley Procedures, supra note 40, at 52,104 (noting that some
commentators questioned whether OSHA could adequately investigate claims involving "complex
matters of corporate securities laws and other financial and accountancy laws and practices");
Cherry, supra note 49, at 1083 n.383.
185. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-722, WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION: SUSTAINED MANAGEMENT ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONG-STANDING
PROGRAM WEAKNESSES (2010) [hereinafter GAO 2010 REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/308767.pdf, U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-106,
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resources to investigate whistleblower claims adequately and that OSHA's.... 186
investigators often lacked training to investigate complex cases. For example,
between 2003 and 2009, OSHA did not receive any new resources for
whistleblower protection, despite the addition of hundreds of new cases.
87
Moreover, between one-third and one-half of investigators said they did not
receive any training on Sarbanes-Oxley, 188 while three-fourths said they needed
more training on Sarbanes-Oxley to do their jobs. 189  The GAO found that
OSHA has done little "to ensure that all investigators attend [mandatory]
training" or "have the necessary tools to do their job." 190  Not surprisingly,
OSHA investigators cited Sarbanes-Oxley as the Act they most often needed
help understanding because of its complexity, different burden of proof, and the
unique types of disclosures the Act protects. 191 Ultimately, in 2010, the GAO
concluded, "OSHA's lack of focus on training may jeopardize the quality and
consistency of investigations."
192
In 2010, the Department of Labor Inspector General (DOL IG) similarly
concluded, "OSHA did not always ensure that complainants received appropriate
investigations under the Whistleblower Protection Program."' 93  The audit
revealed that approximately 80% of whistleblower investigations under the
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Surface
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM: BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT WOULD
HELP ENSURE PROGRAM QUALITY AND CONSISTENCY (2009) [hereinafter GAO 2009 REPORT],
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/285189.pdf.
186. See GAO 2010 REPORT, supra note 185, at 2; GAO 2009 REPORT, supra note 185, at 5.
187. See GAO 2009 REPORT, supra note 185, at 2-3; see also GAO 2010 REPORT, supra note
185, at 16-17 (reporting that the number of OSHA whistleblower investigators remained "relatively
flat" from 1978 to 2010, even though the number of statutes for which OSHA is responsible had
grown from eight in 1978 to eighteen in 2010).
188. See GAO 2009 REPORT, supra note 185, at 6.
189. See id. at 19-20.
190. GAO 2010 REPORT, supra note 185, at 21-22.
191. See GAO 2009 REPORT, supra note 185, at 39. The GAO 2009 REPORT found that:
In our interviews, officials and investigators cited Sarbanes-Oxley cases as particularly
complex and time-consuming, with different officials equating the work required for one
Sarbanes-Oxley case to the work required for two to six cases under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. One official explained that Sarbanes-Oxley cases take the longest
to investigate for several reasons: investigators must learn financial terminology; the
cases tend to require more detailed, often legal, research with little case precedent; and
the employers are often large corporations that engage a larger contingent of attorneys
than do employers in other types of whistleblower cases. Attorney involvement and
settlement negotiations-which are especially common with Sarbanes-Oxley cases-
involve substantial paperwork and processing at various points, such as for requests for
extensions to allow attorneys to conduct their own investigations.
Id. at 19-20.
192. See GAO 2010 REPORT, supra note 185, at 25.
193. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.-OFFICE OF AUDIT, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT NO. 02-
10-202-10-105, COMPLAINANTS DID NOT ALWAYS RECEIVE APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATIONS
UNDER THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM 3 (2010) [hereinafter DEP'T OF LABOR IG
REPORT], available at http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2010/02-10-202-10-105.pdf.
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Transportation Assistance Act "did not meet one or more of eight elements from
the Whistleblower Investigations Manual that were essential to the investigative
process."'1 94  In 23% of cases, an investigator failed to conduct a formal
interview with a complainant, and 44% of the time an investigator did not
identify any complainant witnesses, a process the DOL IG believes to be
"critical to successfully develop[ing] relevant and sufficient evidence in order to
support the complainant's allegation and reach an appropriate determination of
the case."' 95 Even if OSHA identified witnesses, in 37% of the total cases, an
investigator did not interview them. 196  Also, OSHA did not provide
complainants the opportunity to respond to the employer's allegations in 38% of
the cases.
97
The DOL IG reiterated the GAO conclusion that Sarbanes-Oxley's
complexity created a stumbling block for the investigators. The audit found that
"many investigators did not have access to subject matter experts for technical
guidance on the [seventeen] statutes they were responsible for enforcing."
19 8
Moreover, the Whistleblower Investigations Manual had not been updated since
2003, and, as a result, the investigators did not have any written guidance on
how to conduct investigations under the three new statutes that had taken effect
since the last update.' 99 Also, the DOL IG found that OSHA overworked its
investigators because the agency was understaffed. 20 0  Even after OSHA
received approval to hire twenty-five new investigators in 2010, the agency only
hired,, or planned to hire, sixteen. 2°  Furthermore, OSHA did not properly
distribute its investigators across the OSHA regions to address caseload
disparity. 202 Lastly, the DOL IG criticized the program because OSHA's
national office did not review the program consistently, and the office lacked
internal controls to measure the program's performance.
In response to these external audits, OSHA conducted its own "top-to-
bottom review., 20 4 OSHA's own findings reflected the problems revealed by the
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id. at4.
196. Id.
197, Id. at 5.
198. Id. at 2. OSHA investigated whistleblower complaints under seventeen statutes at the
time of the DOL IG study. Now, OSHA oversees twenty-one whistleblower laws. See
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., The Whistleblower Protection Program, OSHA (May 15,
2012), http://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutespage.html (listing statutes under OSHA's
jurisdiction).
199. See DEP'T OF LABOR IG REPORT at 2. As I noted in 2007, even the 2003 Manual
inadequately described Sarbanes-Oxley's burden of proof and complexity. See Moberly, Unfulfilled
Expectations, supra note 5, at 125-26.
200. See DEP'T OF LABOR IG REPORT, supra note 193, at 8.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 7.
203. See id. at 10.
204. Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., US. Department of Labor's OSHA
Announces Measures to Improve Whistleblower Protection Program, OSHA (Aug. 1, 2011)
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GAO and the DOL IG. OSHA's report disclosed that 65% of its Whistleblower
Protection Program managers believed the program was stressed, while 29%
believed it was broken. 205 Furthermore, nonmanagement employees believed
206
overwhelmingly that the whistleblower program was not a priority for OSHA.
The internal review found many of the same problems as the other audits: a lack
of training and resources, 20 7 investigators overwhelmed by the complexity of the




My 2007 empirical study also revealed that ALJs and the ARB issued a
series of decisions reading Sarbanes-Oxley's protections narrowly. 210 For
example, ALJs often made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Act to cover• 211
employees of privately held subsidiaries of publicly traded companies. ALJs
subsequently received support for this narrow interpretation from a 2006
decision in which the ARB found that a publicly traded company could be liable
under Sarbanes-Oxley for retaliation by a privately held subsidiary only if an
employee specifically demonstrated that the subsidiary acted as an agent of the
212
parent company in committing the retaliation.
Moreover, ALJs often narrowed the scope of Sarbanes-Oxley's "protected
activity" to the detriment of employees. 213 The ARB later enshrined the ALJs'
restrictive approach by determining that whistleblowers had to "definitively and
214
specifically" connect their disclosure to one of the -six listed illegalities.Additionally, instead of protecting whistleblowers who disclose any of the six
[hereinafter OSHA Press Release], available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.showd
ocument?ptable=NEWSRELEASES&pid=20394 (announcing that the agency is taking steps to
strengthen the program, and releasing an internal report detailing a review of the program).
205. RITA LUCERO ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA'S WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
PROGRAM REVIEW: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 37 (2010), available at http://www.whistle
blowers.gov/top bottom report.pdf.
206. Id.
207. See id at 37-38, 50.
208. See id. at 37.
209. See id. at 40 (noting that because the Manual has not been updated since 2003, "the field
lacks up to date guidance, especially on new statutes that creates inconsistent results from region to
region.").
210. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 109-20 (citations omitted).
211. Seeid. at 110-12.
212. See Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., ARB No. 04-149, ALJ No. 04-
SOX-] 1, at 14 (Dep't of Labor May 31, 2006), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/
DECISIONS/ARBDECISIONS/SOX/04 149.SOXP.PDF.
213. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 113-20 (citations omitted).
214. Platone v. FLYi, Inc., ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27, at 17 (Dep't of Labor
Sept. 29, 2006) (quoting Kester v. Carolina Power & Light Co., ARB No. 02-007, ALJ No. 2000-
ERA-31, at 9 (Dep't of Labor Sept. 30, 2003)), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/
PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARBDECISIONS/SOX/04_154.SOXP.PDF.
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different types of fraud listed in the statute, the ARB determined that the fraud
reported must "relat[e] to fraud against shareholders" 215 and be "of a type that
,,2 16would be adverse to investors' interests. Further, the fraud had to be
material, 21 7 as defined by securities laws to mean information 'that a
reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding how to vote. 218
Although no study has been completed of Sarbanes-Oxley decisions in
federal court, some evidence exists that the federal judiciary's decisions reflect
the administrative judges' narrow rulings. When reviewing ARB decisions,
federal appellate courts seem willing to defer to the ARB's narrow reading of the
Act.219  Furthermore, when district courts heard cases de novo after
whistleblowers withdrew the case from OSHA's jurisdiction, some courts
reiterated the administrative perspective. For example, some courts drew the
same line between privately held subsidiaries and publicly traded companies as
drawn by the ARB. 22  Additionally, at least four circuit courts adopted the
standard that a whistleblower's complaint must "definitively and specifically"
221relate to one of the six areas of protected disclosures. Moreover, courts found
that disclosures related to violations of "any rule or regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission" under the Act refers only to regulations prohibiting
fraud-although that limitation does not exist in the Act's language.222 Courts
also followed the ARB in determining that the fraud disclosed must be fraud
directed at shareholders, another limitation not found in the Act itself 223 Federal
215. Id. at 15 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006)).
216. Id. at 15 (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(preamble stating the purpose of the Act is "[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes")).
217. Id. at 16 (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005)).
218. Id. at 16 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)).
219. See, e.g., Gale v. Dep't of Labor, 384 F. App'x 926, 928 (1 1th Cir. 2010) ("Although we
review matters of law de novo[,] we must apply due deference to the Secretary of Labor's
interpretation of the statutes which he administers."); Platone v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 548 F.3d 322,
326 (4th Cir. 2008) (referencing the deference given to the ARB); Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269,
276 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that the court would give deference to the ARB's interpretation of
Sarbanes-Oxley under the doctrine set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
220. See, e.g., Hein v. AT&T Operations, Inc., [2010-2011 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,984, at 97,250 (D. Colo. Dec. 16, 2010); Rao v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 89 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 42,814, at 30,071 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2007). But see Carnero v. Boston Scientific
Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that an employee of a subsidiary is a covered employee
when officers of the publicly traded parent company have the authority to affect the employment of
the subsidiary's employees).
221. See Van Asdale v. Int'l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2009); Day v.
Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2009); Welch, 536 F.3d at 275; Allen v. Admin. Review Bd.,
514 F.3d 468, 476-77 (5th Cir. 2008).
222. E.g., Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc., 520 F.3d 344, 351 & n.1 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1514A (2006)).
223. See, e.g., Bishop v. PCS Admin. (USA), Inc., [2006 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93.882, at 90,578 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2006). But see O'Mahony v. Accenture Ltd., 537 F.
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courts mirrored the high standards set forth by the ARB regarding the disclosures
about fraud, concluding that the disclosure must "at least approximate the basic
elements of a claim of securities fraud' 224 and that the improprieties disclosed be
"material" to investors. 225  At least one court even shortsightedly refused to
protect disclosures of a violation that could happen in the future because it
interpreted the Act to protect only whistleblowers who reported existing
226violations. Even a whistleblower's "reasonable belief' of a violation was
insufficient: rather than speculating about wrongdoing, whistleblowers would
receive protection only for reporting actual illegality.227 Courts have also denied
plaintiffs jury trials, 228 presumably one of the primary reasons a whistleblower
might opt for federal court.
These types of decisions may have influenced whistleblowers to withdraw
their OSHA claims. Had Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims received better
treatment in federal court than in the Department of Labor, withdrawals likely
would have risen over the last decade.229 Instead, the percentage of withdrawals
to federal court from the OSHA process has remained steady-between ten and
seventeen percent-during the last ten years.230
Supp. 2d 506, 516-517 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting the reasoning in this line of cases); Reyna v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1382 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (also rejecting the reasoning).
224. Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Day, 555 F.3d at 55) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
225. See, e.g., Day, 555 F.3d at 56 ("The employee need not reference a specific statute, or
prove actual harm, but he must have an objectively reasonable belief that the company intentionally
misrepresented or omitted certain facts to investors, which were material and which risked loss.");
Livingston, 520 F.3d at 355 (stating that a statement or omission "must concern a material fact" to
be actionable).
226. See Livingston, 520 F.3d at 352.
227. See Walton v. Nova Info. Sys., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034-36 (E.D. Tenn. 2007).
228. See, e.g., Skidmore v. ACI Worldwide, Inc., No. 8:08CV01, 2010 WL 2900113, at *3 (D.
Neb. July 20, 2010) (granting defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs jury demand); Van Asdale v.
Int'l Game Tech., No. 3:04-CV-703-RAM, 2010 WL 1490349, at *7 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2010)
("declin[ing] to exercise its discretion to empanel an advisory jury"); Schmidt v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 621 F. Supp. 2d 796, 805-06 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (concluding that plaintiffis not entitled to ajury
trial); Walton v. Nova Info. Sys., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) (finding that
plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 922(c), § 21F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(b)(2)(E) (Supp. 2006)) (amending Sarbanes-Oxley's language to specifically permit jury
trials for whistleblower claims). For a good discussion of whether Sarbanes-Oxley's original
language should have been interpreted to permit jury trials, see Gonzalez, supra note 85, at 28-29.
229. These narrow decisions were not universal, as some courts interpreted Sarbanes-Oxley
more broadly. See, e.g., Schlicksup v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 09-CV-1208, 2010 WL 2774480, at *3-
6 (C.D. Ill. July 13, 2010) (finding that a transfer in positions could be an adverse action sufficient
to support a claim of retaliation); O'Mahony v. Accenture Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 2d 506, 516-17
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that fraud disclosed did not need to be related to shareholder fraud in
order to be protected conduct); Reyna v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1382 (M.D.
Ga. 2007) (rejecting the position that fraud disclosed needed to relate to shareholder fraud).
230. See Petterson Email, supra note 178.
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Thus, after ten years, there is some evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley has neither
prevented nor remedied retaliation against whistleblowers. Two causes of these
failures relate to OSHA's inability to effectively enforce Sarbanes-Oxley's
antiretaliation provision and to narrow and restrictive interpretations of the Act.
C. Addressing Misconduct Effectively
Finally, to evaluate Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower provisions, we should
determine whether they helped increase a whistleblower's effectiveness when
disclosing misconduct. One group of prominent scholars defines the
effectiveness of whistleblowing as "the extent to which the questionable or
wrongful practice (or omission) is terminated at least partly because of whistle-
blowing and within a reasonable time frame." 231 This straightforward definition
belies the difficulty of determining whether it has been met in a given situation.
For example, when should effectiveness be measured? As these same authors
note, "[a] whistle-blower who appeared ineffective at first may have had huge.... ,,232
impact on the organization when viewed several years hence. Additionally,
effectiveness may differ depending on for whom the effectiveness is
measured. 33 Using Enron as an example, these authors ask, "[w]as whistle-
blowing effective at Enron because it protected future shareholders who would
have unwittingly invested in a firm about to go under? Or ineffective because it
did not protect those shareholders who had already invested and therefore lost
their nest eggs? ' 234 Also, effective whistleblowing within an organization may
never be publicized precisely because it was effective and the issue was resolved
without incident. Thus, whether a whistleblower disclosure effectively caused
an organization or external authorities to address the underlying misconduct
presents one of the most difficult empirical issues confronting whistleblower
researchers.235
That said, the 2008 financial crisis suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley did not lead
to effective whistleblowing, at least with regard to the most prominent examples
of corporate fraud in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era. For instance, Eileen Foster,
the Countrywide executive mentioned above, and other Countrywide employees
claim that the company not only failed to address their disclosures about fraud,
236but also retaliated against the whistleblowers. Eventually the company, as
231. MICELI ET AL., supra note 124, at 16 (quoting Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Effective
Whistle-Blowing, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 679, 681 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
232. Id. at 17.
233. Id. at 18.
234. Id.
235. Id. ("In many ways, this is the most difficult variable to measure, of all the variables
concerned with whistle-blowing.... A satisfactory resolution to these definitional questions awaits
future research.").
236. See Bradford, supra note 156; Hudson, supra note 156; see also Michael Hudson,
Countrywide Loan Underwriter Found Herself in 'Dangerous Territory,' CENTER FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Oct. 11, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/10/11/6901/country
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well as Bank of America-which purchased Countrywide in 2008-paid billions
of dollars in settlements and penalties arising out of mortgage fraud allegations,
but not because of the whistleblower disclosures, and only after the fraud
237
damaged millions of shareholders, taxpayers, and homeowners. Similarly,
Richard Bowen of Citigroup claims the company ignored his warnings and also
retaliated against him, first by relieving him of his duties and then ultimately by
firing him. Numerous other whistleblowers allege that management in their
respective companies either ignored or minimized their warnings. 239  One
reporter who spoke with many of these whistleblowers concluded that:
These ex-employees' accounts provide evidence that the muzzling
of whistleblowers played an important role in allowing corruption to
flourish as mortgage lenders and their patrons on Wall Street pumped up
loan volume and profits. Codes of silence at many lenders, former
employees.claim, helped discourage media, regulators and policymakers
from taking a hard look at illegal practices that ultimately harmed
borrowers, investors and the economy.
Government investigations also found that financial company officials ignored
reports of widespread fraud from employees.
241
wide-loan-underwriter-found-herself-dangerous-territory (detailing a former Countrywide
employee's fraud discoveries and allegations of retaliation against whistleblowers); Michael
Hudson, Inside Countrywide, a 'Counseling Meeting' Then Termination, CENTER FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Oct. 18, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/10/18/7103/inside-
countrywide-counseling-meeting-then-termination (detailing multiple former employees
experiences in uncovering fraud and facing retaliation).
237. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 156 ("Once America's largest mortgage lender, the
company has agreed to a litany of settlements since 2008, including a $600 million class-action
settlement, an $108 million settlement with the Federal Trade Commission and the ousting of
former CEO Angelo Mozilo, who paid $67.5 million in penalties to the Securities and Exchange
Commission."); Shira Ovide, Bank of America-Countrywide: Worst Deal in History?, WSJ BLOGS
(June 29, 2011, 2:25 PM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/06/29/bank-of-america-countrywide-
worst-deal-in-history/ (detailing billions of dollars in settlements and penalties paid since 2008);
Michael Hudson, Mortgage Industry Tanks, Fraud Continues at Countrywide, CENTER FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Sep. 23, 2011, 7:30 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/09/23/6706/mortgage-
industry-tanks-fraud-continues-countrywide (outlining the background events and noting
settlements and penalties paid).
238. See 60 Minutes, supra note 156.
239. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 160 (detailing claims of former employees that
whistleblowers were ignored and punished by lenders for either reporting or refusing to commit
fraud).
240. Id.
241. See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SENATE, WALL STREET AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 95 (Apr. 13, 2011) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT] ("Perhaps the clearest evidence of WaMu's shoddy lending practices came when senior
management was informed of loans containing fraudulent information, but then did little to stop the
fraud."). The Report also found that:
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Not surprisingly, company officials denied the al'egation that any retaliation
242had occurred. However, an impressive number of employees have either won
retaliation lawsuits against the companies or entered into confidential settlement
agreements. For example, OSHA reinstated Eileen Foster and awarded her
$930,000 in back pay after investigating her claim of retaliation under Sarbanes-
Oxley.243  OSHA also awarded over $1 million to a whistleblower from
Washington Mutual who alleged the company retaliated against her for reporting
244violations of federal lending laws.  A California jury awarded a Countrywide
whistleblower a $3.8 million verdict. 245 The media has reported on several other
246
settlements with financial industry whistleblowers. These ex post awards
compensated the employees for the retaliation and validated their claims of
reporting the misconduct. However, they came too late to stop the billions of
dollars in losses resulting from the mortgage crisis.
One reason that whistleblower reports failed to stop the fraud may be that
the structural model put in place by Sarbanes-Oxley did not adequately channel
whistleblower disclosures to the board of directors. In fact, surveys demonstrate
that, despite having access to a hotline, employees typically report initially to
supervisors, 247 who then have great power to block and filter the reports. 248 This
Loans not meeting the bank's credit standards, deliberate risk layering, sales
associates manufacturing documents, offices issuing loans in which 58%, 62%, or 83%
contained evidence of loan fraud, and selling fraudulent loans to investors are evidence of
deep seated problems that existed within WaMu's lending practices. Equally disturbing
is evidence that when WaMu senior managers were confronted with evidence of
substantial loan fraud, they failed to take corrective action.
Id. at 103.
242. See Hudson, supra note 160; 60 Minutes, supra note 156 (publicizing letter denying
retaliation against Bowen).
243. Hudson, supra note 156; Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Department of
Labor Finds Bank of America in Violation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act Whistleblower Protection
Provisions: Bank Ordered to Reinstate Fired Employee and Pay $930,000, OSHA (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?p-table=NEWS -RELEASES&p-id=2
0667. See generally Michael Hudson, Mortgage Industry Whistleblower Wins Case Against Bank
of America, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sep. 14, 2011, 7:27 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.
org/20l1/09/14/6467/mortgage-industry-whistleblower-wins-case-against-bank-america (stating that
Bank of America plans to appeal the OSHA decision to an ALJ).
244. See Hudson, supra note 160.
245. Gretchen Morgenson, How a Whistle-Blower Conquered Countrywide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2011, at BUI; Michael Hudson, Management Gurus Claim They Were Blindsided by Toxic
Culture at Countrywide, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 13, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.
publicintegrity.org/2011/12/13/7606/management-gurus-claim-they-were-blindsided-toxic-culture-cou
ntrywide. Bank of America has appealed the decision, claiming that it was not supported by the
evidence. Id.
246. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 160 (noting settlements by Citizens Financial Mortgage and
Wells Fargo); Bob Ivry, Woman Who Couldn't Be Intimidated by Citigroup Wins $31 Million,
Bloomberg (May 31, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/woman-who-
couldn-t-be-intimidated-by-citigroup-wins-3 l-million.html (reporting on whistleblower settlement
with Citigroup).
247. See, e.g., ETHICS RES. CTR., BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON WORKPLACE MISCONDUCT 5
(2010), available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/WhistleblowerWP.pdf (noting that 46% of
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data appears to correspond with a different report examining corporate codes of
ethics. This study found that most codes of ethics direct employees to report
misconduct to their supervisors. 249 Despite Sarbanes-Oxley's requirement that
companies have a whistleblower hotline, less than half of corporate codes of
ethics identify a hotline for employees to use, and slightly less than half of those
provide any contact information for the hotline in the code itself.250 Only 2.2%
of the codes gave employees the option of reporting misconduct to an external
authority. 251 Perhaps not surprisingly, according to an Ethics Resource Center
survey, only 3% of whistleblowers use company hotlines to report misconduct,
while another 4% report the wrongdoing externally.
252
Moreover, a different Ethics Resource Center survey conducted in 2011
found that 42% of employees-the highest percentage since 2000-said that
their company has a weak ethical culture. 25  Misconduct can flourish more
readily at a company with a weak ethical culture. 254  Time after time,
whistleblowers in the financial industry complained that their company culture
encouraged and fostered the fraudulent behavior that resulted in the 2008
meltdown. 255 All of these statistics and evidence suggest that Sarbanes-Oxley,
above all else, failed to change corporate culture sufficiently to address
misconduct when employees report it.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
Encouragingly, developments in the last two years of the decade
demonstrate that policymakers may have learned from the Sarbanes-Oxley
experience. First, in addition to focusing on the substance of various
whistleblower statutory protections, renewed energy has been put towards
determining who is involved in administering those protections. As a result,
whistleblower reports went to an employee's immediate supervisor, while another 29% went to
"higher management").
248. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 5, at 1121-25; see also Jennifer A. Johnson,
Recent Cases Cast Doubt on Efficacy of Whistleblower Programs, PHX. Bus. J. (May 11, 2012, 3:00
AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/print-edition/2012/05/11/recent-cases-cast-doubt-on-effi
cacy-of.html (noting that recent cases, including Wal-Mart de Mexico's bribery scandal, involved
corporate officials covering up whistleblower complaints instead of investigating and reporting
them to regulators).
249. See Moberly & Wylie, supra note I 11, at 35.
250. See id. at 35-36.
251. See id. at 36 (noting that only two of the eighty-nine codes examined mentioned an
external recipient).
252. ETHICs RES. CTR., supra note 247, at 5.
253. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 111, at 19.
254. See id. at 20.
255. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 241, at 95-103 (describing lack of internal controls at
Washington Mutual leading to pervasive fraud); id. at 143 ("WaMu's compensation policies were
rooted in the bank culture that put loan sales ahead of loan quality."); Hudson, supra note 159;
Hudson, supra note 245 (describing a "toxic culture" at Countrywide).
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newly appointed whistleblower advocates in key government positions have
begun to address the roadblocks previously used to thwart the strong
antiretaliation protection Congress initially envisioned for the Act. Second, in
2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act to address the failings that preceded
the most recent financial crisis.256 This Act applies a radically different model to
encourage whistleblowers by using financial rewards in addition to Sarbanes-
Oxley's traditional models.
257
A. People Matter as Much as Provisions
As described above, at least two administrative departments undermined
Sarbanes-Oxley's antiretaliation protections. OSHA's investigators failed to
perform sufficient investigations of Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation claims for a
variety of reasons, including lack of resources and inadequate training regarding
a new, complex statute.258  Also, the ARB issued a series of decisions
259dramatically narrowing the scope of Sarbanes-Oxley's protections.
The composition of both of these agencies changed during the last two years
as President Obama's appointments began to reshape the Department of Labor.
Interestingly, some recent developments suggest that this change in leadership
may breathe new life into Sarbanes-Oxley's previously moribund protections.
1. OSHA
First, President Obama appointed David Michaels as Assistant Secretary of
Labor in charge of OSHA.260 After the Senate confirmed Michaels in December
2009, 26 1 he quickly issued a "vision statement" in which he highlighted the
262importance of giving workers "voice" through whistleblower protection. In
that statement, Michaels singled out the Whistleblower Protection Program
(WPP) as an area that needed strengthening because it did not work:
256. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
257. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 74-75
(2012) (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 922(a),
§ 21F(g)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1844 (2010)).
258. See supra notes 185-209 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
260. See Dr. David Michaels Confirmed to Assume Post as Head of OSHA, QUICK TAKES
(OSHA, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/quicktakes/qtl2012009.
html.
261. See id
262. See David Michaels, OSHA at Forty: New Challenges and New Directions, OSHA (July
19, 2010), http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/Michaels-vision.html.
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We have been given the responsibility to enforce the whistleblower
provisions of 17 statutes, with more likely to be added in the very near
263future. The importance of this work is enormous, as is the challenge
of doing it well. OSHA whistleblower personnel strive to obtain justice
for aggrieved workers covered under a mosaic of laws with different
requirements, in tremendously varied subject areas, while carrying
heavy case loads. Even in situations where the injustice is apparent, too
often we are unable to protect the worker who has been the object of
discrimination or retaliation. This system is clearly not functioning well
and we must find ways to improve it. Toward this end, we have begun a
comprehensive review of our Whistleblower Protection Program, in
order to identify ways to strengthen it.
264
Secretary Michaels followed up this statement by commissioning the "top-
265to-bottom review" of the WPP mentioned above. In response to the criticisms
from the independent audits by the Department of Labor Inspector General and
the Government Accountability Office, and the weaknesses disclosed in this
internal review, 266 Michaels promised a number of reforms. 267 He pledged better
training and more resources for the WPP,268 a promise he has tried to fulfill with
the administration's budget request for fiscal year 2013.269 That request made
whistleblower protection a priority by asking for $4.9 million in new funding
270
and thirty-seven additional full-time employees. Moreover, he moved the
WPP out from under the Directorate of Enforcement to a stand-alone program
271
reporting directly to the Assistant Secretary for OSHA.
Additionally, OSHA issued a newly revised Whistleblower Investigation
Manual that greatly improves upon the last manual, released in 2003. It
discusses all of the recently added statutory protections and also provides a
273
correct summary of Sarbanes-Oxley's legal requirements. Importantly, itaccurately describes Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower-friendly burden of
263. Michaels proved to be prescient: OSHA currently administers twenty-one different
whistleblower statutes. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., supra note 198 (listing statutes
under OSHA's jurisdiction).
264. Michaels, supra note 262.
265. See OSHA Press Release, supra note 204.
266. See supra notes 185-203 and accompanying text.
267. See OSHA Press Release, supra note 204.
268. See id.
269. See Laura Walter, OSHA FY 2013 Budget Request Includes Whistleblower Funding
Increase, Regional Office Consolidation, EHSTODAY (Feb. 14, 2012), http://ehstoday.com/
standards/news/OSHA-budget-whistleblower-0214/.
270. See Stephen Lee, Obama Request for $565.5 Million for OSHA Would Increase
Whistleblower Funding, 26 LAB. REL. WK. 267, 297 (2012).
271. See OSHA Press Release, supra note 204.
272. See OSHA, WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL (2011) [hereinafter 2011
MANUAL], available at http://osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL 02-03-003.pdf.
273. See id. at 14-1 to -5.
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proof,274 which the 2003 Manual failed to acknowledge. 275  Also, it requires
investigators to attempt to interview the complainant in all cases, which,
remarkably, the 2003 Manual did not require as explicitly. 276 The new Manual
makes clear that OSHA will accept complaints orally as well as in writing,
including electronically over the internet.
Secretary Michaels' leadership may be having an effect, as OSHA recently
issued a number of orders in favor of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers. In March
2010, OSHA ordered reinstatement of two separate whistleblowers along with
27827payment of over $600,000 to one and more than $1 million to the other. 7 In
June 2010, OSHA ordered U.S. Bank to reinstate a whistleblower and pay back
wages. 28  In September 2011, OSHA ordered a company and its former CEO to
pay a whistleblower approximately $500,000 in back pay. As mentioned
above, also in September 2011, OSHA ordered Bank of America to reinstate
whistleblower Eileen Foster and pay her approximately $930,000 in back wages,
282interest, and compensatory damages. Finally, in August 2012, OSHA
determined that Deutsche Telekom AG and subsidiary T-Mobile USA Inc.
retaliated against a whistleblower who reported that the companies potentially
charged customers millions of dollars in fraudulent roaming charges; OSHA
274. See id. at 3-7 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley and other statutes "require a lower standard to
establish causation and a higher standard of proof in order to establish a respondent's affirmative
defense").
275. See OSHA, WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 3-2, 3-3, 14-1 to -11 (2003)
[hereinafter 2003 MANUAL], available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directivepdf/DISO-
0_9.pdf.
276. See 2011 MANUAL, supra note 272, at iv, 3-15 (noting changes to the 2003 MANUAL).
277. See id. at 2-1.
278. See Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., US Department of Labor's
OSHA Orders e-Smart Technologies Inc. to Pay Whistleblower Back Wages and $600,000 in
Compensatory Damages, OSHA (March 3, 2010), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/
oshaweb/owadisp.show document?ptable=NEWSRELEASES&pid= 17214.
279. See Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., US Labor Department Orders
Tennessee Commerce Bank to Reinstate Whistleblower and Pay More Than $1 Million in Back
Wages and Other Relief, OSHA (March 18, 2010), available at http://www.osha.gov/
pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?ptable=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=17283.
280. See Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., US Bank in Seattle Ordered to
Pay Back Wages, Reinstate Former Manager Terminated in Violation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Whistleblower Provisions, OSHA (June 1, 2010), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/osha
web/owadisp.show document?ptable=NEWSRELEASES&pid= 17853.
28 1. See Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., US Department of Labor Finds
Nutritional Beverage Company, Former CEO in Violation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act Whistleblower
Protection Provisions, OSHA (Sept. 15, 2011), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/osha
web/owadisp.showdocument?ptable=NEWSRELEASES&pid=20676.
282. See Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., US Department ofLabor Finds
Bank of America in Violation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act Whistleblower Protection Provisions, OSHA
(Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document
?ptable=NEWSRELEASES&pid=20667.
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subsequently ordered reinstatement and payment of $345,972 to the employee. 283
Given that during the three-year period between fiscal years 2006 and 2008
OSHA did not find in favor of a single whistleblower, these victories with
substantial financial awards may mark a new beginning for the statute's
antiretaliation provision.
2. ARB
Second, recent appointments to the ARB reconfigured its political makeup
and, apparently, its outlook towards the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
provision. In 2010 and 2011, President Obama's Secretary of Labor, Hilda
Solis, appointed five new members to the ARB's five-member panel. 285 As two
whistleblower advocates claimed at the time, "[t]ogether they have the most
experience, subject matter expertise, and demonstrated commitments to the
board's mission of any members in its history., 286 Perhaps as a result of this
new makeup, the new ARB found in favor of whistleblowers more often than its
predecessors. 287 During a six-month period in 2010, after the appointment of
four of these new members, whistleblowers won six out of sixteen cases (37.5%)
before the ARB on the merits, as opposed to 19.75% (eight out of forty-one
cases) in 2009.288
As important, the new ARB also reversed the Board's restrictive
interpretations of Sarbanes-Oxley and significantly expanded the scope of the
Act's whistleblower protection. 289  In 2011, the Board held that a
whistleblower's protected activity no longer had to relate to shareholders'
interest, nor did the fraud disclosed have to be "material." 290  Moreover, it
283. See Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., US Department of Labor
Orders T-Mobile and Deutsche Telekom to Pay Whistleblower Nearly $346,000 in Back Wages,
Damages, OSHA (Aug. 9, 2012), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show
_document?ptable=NEWSRELEASES&pid=22830.
284. See Petterson Email, supra note 178.
285. See ARB Board Members, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/arb/members.htm
(last visited Sept. 16, 2012).
286. TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER'S
SURVIVAL GUIDE 183 (2011) (citing ARB Board Members, supra note 285).
287. See id.
288. Id.
289. See Moberly, supra note 107, at 62-66 (citations omitted) (discussing the ARB's 2011
decisions).
290. See Funke v. Fed. Express Corp., ARB No. 09-004, ALJ No. 2007-SOX-043, at 8 (Dep't
of Labor July 8, 2011) (shareholders' interest); Sylvester v. Parexel Int'l LLC, ARB No. 07-123,
ALJ Nos. 2007-SOX-039 & 2007-SOX-042, at 22 (Dep't of Labor May 25, 2011) (materiality);
Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., ARB No. 10-050, ALJ No. 2008-SOX-049, at 9 (Dep't of Labor
Feb. 28, 2011) (citing Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., ARB No. 04-149, ALJ No.
04-SOX-1 1, at 17 (Dep't of Labor May 31, 2006)) (shareholders' interest). The Board arguably
went even further and found that a whistleblower's protected disclosure did not have to disclose
fraudulent conduct at all, as long as it could be seen as "in the furtherance of a 'scheme or artifice to
defraud."' Brown, ARB No. 10-050, at 9 (quoting Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 2008-
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dispensed with the need for a whistleblower to "definitively and specifically"
identify a securities fraud violation as part of a disclosure of misconduct.29 1 The
Board also determined that the Dodd-Frank Act "clarified" that Sarbanes-Oxley
applied to privately held subsidiaries of publicly traded companies-a decision
292that overturned-prior ARB decisions regarding this issue.
When confronting new questions, the revamped ARB interpreted Sarbanes-
Oxley broadly rather than narrowly.293 In Funke v. Federal Express Corp.,294 for
example, the ARB held that a whistleblower could make a disclosure to local or
state law enforcement, despite ambiguity in Sarbanes-Oxley's language about
whether the Act protects such reports. 295 Similarly, the new ARB expanded the
definition of "adverse action" under Sarbanes-Oxley to include reprisals that are
"more than trivial,, 296 a standard that likely would cover a broader range of
retaliatory actions than the Supreme Court previously found actionable for Title
VII claims in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.2 9 7 The
ARB used this new standard to find an adverse action when a company merely
released the name of the whistleblower to its employees as part of its internal
investigation into the employee's complaint.
298
SOX-00049, ALJ's Recommended Decision & Order (Dep't of Labor Jan. 15, 2010)). The Board
did leave open the possibility that a complaint may concern "such a trivial matter" that there is no
protected activity. Sylvester, ARB No. 07-123, at 22.
291. See Sylvester, ARB No. 07-123, at 18.
292. See Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc., ARB No. 08-032, ALJ No. 2005-SOX-015, at
16 (Dep't of Labor Mar. 31, 2011); see also Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at
134-37 (discussing clarification of the term "covered employer").
293. See Moberly, supra note 107, at 62-64 (citations omitted).
294. ARB No. 09-004, ALJ No. 2007-SOX-043 (Dep't of Labor July 8, 2011).
295. Id. at 16 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006)). Sarbanes-Oxley's language states that, in
order to receive protection, a whistleblower must report misconduct to "(A) a Federal regulatory or
law enforcement agency; (B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or (C) a
person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person working for the
employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct)." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(a)(1). The ambiguity results because it is unclear whether the term "Federal" in subsection
A modifies "law enforcement agency" as well as "regulatory." The ARB in Funke concluded that
only protecting reports to federal law enforcement would result in a "hypertechnical distinction"
that would be inconsistent with the goal of the statute to promote disclosures. Funke, ARB No. 09-
004, at 16.
296. Menendez v. Halliburton, Inc., ARB Nos. 09-002 & 09-003, ALJ No. 2007-SOX-005, at
17 (Dep't of Labor Sept. 13, 2011) (quoting Williams v. American Airlines, Inc., ARB No. 09-018,
ALJ No. 2007-AIR-004, at 13 (Dep't of Labor Dec. 29, 2010)).
297. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). The ARB distinguished Burlington Northern and found that the case
helped determine the scope of prohibited actions, but was not dispositive because Sarbanes-Oxley
clearly prohibits "a very broad spectrum" of retaliatory activity, including non-tangible adverse
actions. See Menendez, ARB Nos. 09-002 & 09-003, at 15-16 (citing Hendrix v. American
Airlines, Inc., ALJ Case Nos. 2004-AIR-00010 & 2004-SOX-00023, at 14 n.10 (Dep't of Labor
Dec. 9, 2004)).
298. See Menendez, ARB Nos. 09-002 & 09-003, at 22-26. The ARB supported this
conclusion by noting that this breach of confidentiality violated Sarbanes-Oxley § 301's
requirement that companies provide a confidential, anonymous reporting channel for
whistleblowers to report misconduct. See id.
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In addition to broadening Sarbanes-Oxley's reach, the new ARB restricted
employer defenses. In Vannoy v. Celanese Corp.,299 the ARB seemed to
undermine an employer's ability to fire an employee for taking confidential
documents, if the employee uses the documents as part of the whistleblowing
300process. In doing so, the ARB noted that "[t]here is a clear tension between a
company's legitimate business policies protecting confidential information and
the whistleblower bounty programs created by Congress to encourage
whistleblowers to disclose confidential company information in furtherance of
enforcement of tax and securities laws." 30 1 The ARB remanded the case because
it determined that the ALJ did not sufficiently consider the employee's need for
company documents in order to provide original information to government
regulators.3 °2
3. Internal Disclosure Channels
In addition to these administrative changes, the conclusion about the
important role of people applies to internal company policies as much as
statutory whistleblower protections. Sarbanes-Oxley's structural model and
codes of ethics are not enough. Numerous studies suggest that a strong ethical
culture encourages employees to report,30 3 and that people-not necessarily
policies and codes--create and perpetuate that culture. 304 For example, in the
landmark Australian study of public-sector whistleblowing, the authors
concluded that managers had the most impact on whether employees felt
comfortable reporting misconduct. 30 5  The Ethics Resource Center study
299. ARB No. 09-118, ALJ No. 2008-SOX-064 (Dep't of Labor Sept. 28, 2011).
300. See id. at 15-17.
301. Id. at 16.
302. See id. at 17.
303. See, e.g., MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 158-60, 297
(1992) (citations omitted) (discussing organization climate and culture in relation to
whistleblowing); MICELI ET AL., supra note 124, at 186-88 (citations omitted) (suggesting actions
managers can take); Linda Klebe Trevifio et al., Managing to Be Ethical: Debunking Five Business
Ethics Myths, 18 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 69, 73 (2004) (citations omitted) (explaining that adults
"look outside themselves for guidance in ethical-dilemma situations"); Gary R. Weaver & Linda
Klebe Trevifto, Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics Programs: Influences on Employees'
Attitudes and Behavior, 9 Bus. ETHICS Q. 315, 333 (1999) (concluding that employee perceptions
of ethics program orientation are important).
304. See ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 111, at 21; MICELI & NEAR, supra note 303, at 161,
167-68, 287 (citations omitted); MICELI ET AL., supra note 124, at 187 ("In general, the
results ... of prior empirical research support the notion that top managers should create a culture
for encouraging good performance that is ethical."); Trevifio et al., supra note 303, at 73-74
(citations omitted); Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Programs as Control Systems:
Influences of Executive Commitment and Environmental Factors, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 41, 54
(1999).
305. See Rodney Smith & A.J. Brown, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Whistleblowing
Outcomes, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 122, at 109,
110-11, 121-22, 125-26, 135.
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similarly demonstrated that companies with a strong ethics program had less
wrongdoing, more reporting, and less retaliation.3 °6 Importantly, the study found
that individuals-specifically senior executives and supervisors-drove and
influenced the culture more than anything else.
30 7
Thus, the experience with Sarbanes-Oxley over the last decade teaches that
individual players in the system, such as organizational supervisors, government
administrators, and adjudicatory decision makers, impact whistleblowers as
much as, if not more than, any formal legal provisions. This impact can
undermine the protections the formal provisions appear to provide. In other
words, formal whistleblower mechanisms, while necessary, do not sufficiently
protect and encourage whistleblowers by themselves. People interpret and
enforce them, indicating that perhaps we ought to spend as much effort
determining who is involved in whistleblower protection as we do deciding what
those protections should formally entail.
The problem with this lesson, of course, is that it is not very satisfactory.
We should be uneasy that the actions of whoever is in power could so easily
determine the success or failure of a whistleblowing system. Perhaps the United
States should begin thinking about how systems and machinery to support
whistleblowers can be put in place to survive the inevitable transition of
308power. Such structures could focus more on disclosure and transparency
regarding the results of whistleblowing so that outside agencies and academics
can more easily track successes and failures. Additional and overlapping
independent oversight of whistleblower programs also could help bring
accountability to whistleblowing systems so as to provide consistency across
different administrations.30 9
B. Applying a New Model
In response to the financial crisis in 2008, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank310
Act, which (among numerous other reforms) attempted to encourage more
whistleblowing from private-sector employees. As noted above, Dodd-Frank
contains its own strongly worded antiretaliation provision and amends Sarbanes-
Oxley's antiretaliation protections to fix weaknesses that had become
306. ETHICS RES. CTR., s'upra note 111, at 35.
307. Id. at 21.
308. Cf Whistleblower Protection Programs for Entities, Australian Standard, AS 8004-2003
(2004) (recommending certain whistleblowing procedures); Brown et al., supra note 124, at 267-71
(describing organizational structures that support whistleblowing); Roberts, supra note 122, at 235
(discussing the importance ofwhistleblowing procedures and structures).
309. Cf Brown et al., supra note 124, at 269-71, 284-85 (recommending agency oversight of
public-sector whistleblowing).
310. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
311. See id. secs. 748, 922, 1057.
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apparent.312  In addition, it utilizes the "bounty model" of encouraging
whistleblowing-a radically different approach to whistleblowing than the
traditional antiretaliation and structural models typically employed in the private
sector.
313
The bounty model financially rewards whistleblowers with a percentage of
the fines or penalties collected as a result of the misconduct reported by the
whistleblower. 314 Before Dodd-Frank, the False Claims Act (FCA) presented the
most prominent example of the model.315 Under the FCA, a whistleblower who
reports fraud against the federal government may collect between fifteen and
thirty percent of the amount recovered from the wrongdoer. 316  Scholars and
policymakers generally regard the FCA as the most successful whistleblower law
in the United States. 31 Indeed, since Congress strengthened the law in 1986, the
federal government has recovered more than $30 billion under the law.318
Recently, the government has increased its use of the law such that, during the
Obama presidency alone, the Department of Justice has collected over 25% of
that total ($8.7 billion). 319 Thirty states have adopted similar provisions with
equivalent success. 320 Federal law also permits the Internal Revenue Service to
pay rewards to whistleblowers who report tax evasion.
32 1
312. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (noting that, among other things, Dodd-
Frank lengthened Sarbanes-Oxley's statute of limitations from 90 to 180 days and clarified that the
Act applied to privately held subsidiaries of publicly traded companies).
313. See Rapp, supra note 257, at 74-75 (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,124 Stat. 1376 (2010)).
314. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 278-82
(1992) (citations omitted) (describing examples of federal and state statutory rewards for
whistleblowers); Jarod S. Gonzalez, A Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow: An Economic
Incentives-Based Approach to OSHA Whistleblowing, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 325, 337-38
(2010) (citations omitted) (providing examples of the bounty model).
315. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 314, at 281 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733
(1988)).
316. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006).
317. See, e.g., Rapp, supra note 257, at 76 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006)) (describing
the FCA as the "gold-standard" of whistleblower protection and bounty rewards"); Elizabeth 1.
Winston, The Flawed Nature of the False Marking Statute, 77 TENN. L. REV. 111, 140 (2009)
(citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006)) (calling the FCA "the most vibrant and dominant of all qui
tam actions available in the United States today").
318. See Press Release, Office of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Law Recovers Another $2.8
Billion of Taxpayer Money Otherwise Lost to Fraud, U.S. Senate (Dec. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel dataPagelD_ 502=3834 1.
319. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011, U.S. Dep't of Just. (Dec. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 l/December/Il -civ- I 665.html.
320. See False Claims Act Legal Ctr., State False Claims Acts, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD
EDUC. FUND, http://www.taf.org/states-false-claims-acts (last visited Sept. 16, 2012).
321. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2006).
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Dodd-Frank expanded the use of the model to include whistleblowers who
322report fraud against companies, as opposed to the government. To receive a
reward, whistleblowers report securities fraud to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which will then investigate. 323 If the SEC imposes a fine or
penalty above $1 million, then the whistleblower may receive between ten and
thirty percent of the penalty after filing a claim with the SEC.324  Unlike the
FCA, however, Dodd-Frank does not permit a whistleblower to file a claim on
325behalf of the United States should the SEC decide not to pursue the allegation.
In one sense, although they approach it differently, both the antiretaliation
model and the bounty model have the same goal: encouraging an employee to
disclose wrongdoing. The antiretaliation model attempts to reduce the fear of
retaliation that might keep a person from reporting, while the bounty model
attempts to affirmatively reward the person for disclosing.326 Despite a similar
goal, however, they differ sharply in how they address the underlying
wrongdoing reported by a whistleblower. Antiretaliation provisions address ex
post retaliation but fail to correct the underlying misconduct disclosed. The
bounty model, by contrast, corrects, or at least punishes and provides a remedy
for, the initial wrongdoing. The reward paid to a whistleblower derives directly
from damages caused by the misconduct.
In this way, the bounty model may address the primary weakness the recent
financial crisis exposed about Sarbanes-Oxley: the Act did not lead to effective
whistleblowing that would remedy wrongdoing. By focusing on the underlying
misconduct, the bounty model encourages effective resolution of the problems
reported by whistleblowers, which the antiretaliation model simply ignores. In
322. See Rapp, supra note 257, at 74-75.
323. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
sec. 922, § 21F, 124 Stat. at 1841-42 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6). Dodd-
Frank has parallel bounty provisions for reports made to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. See id. sec. 748, § 23, 124 Stat. at 1739-40 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 26).
324. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (Supp. IV 2010). This section outlines Dodd-Frank's general
parameters, but is not meant to be a comprehensive overview of the statute and its detailed
regulations. See id; Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300
(June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249). Numerous academics and
practitioners have written excellent summaries and analyses of the Act's whistleblower provisions.
See, e.g., Rapp, supra note 257, at 85-87 (citations omitted) (discussing the core features of the
Act); Marc S. Raspanti & Bryan S. Neft, Dodd-Frank Opens Doors on Whistleblower Claims for
Securities Law Violations, 13 LAW. J. 4 (2011), available at http://www.acba.org/ACBA/pdfC
TLJ/TLJvl 3-10-052011 .pdf (analyzing Dodd-Frank's whistleblower provisions).
325. See Rapp, supra note 257, at 76-77.
326. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 314, at 296-301 (citations omitted) (noting that
"social-psychological literature supports the assumption that financial incentives will motivate new
whistleblowers to come forward," but that this conclusion is subject to numerous limitations
depending upon the context). But see Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality,
88 TEX. L. REv. 1151, 1194-1202 (2010) (questioning the effectiveness of financial reward
programs in motivating whistleblowers).
327. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 922, § 21F(b), 124 Stat. at 1841-42.
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other words, rather than attempting to compensate victims of retaliation, it forces
companies to pay for the damages caused by the misconduct disclosed by the
whistleblower. A good example of the difference between the two models can
be found with Citigroup's different reactions to whistleblowing related to the
mortgage crisis. 328 Above, I mentioned Richard Bowen, who reported the
widespread mortgage fraud internally, but whose whistleblowing did not alter
the company's practices nor prompt the company to change its certification to
the government that the company's financial status was secure.3 29  In fact,
Citigroup asserted "the issues raised by Mr. Bowen had no impact on the
integrity or propriety of Citi's financial statements or the accuracy of the
certifications signed in connection with Citi's year-end and quarterly public
filings."
330
In contrast, in August 2011, a Citi quality assurance manager filed a qui tam
whistleblower suit under the False Claims Act, alleging that Citigroup misled the
federal government, which insured mortgage loans that the company knew did
not meet appropriate standards for such insurance. 331 Many of the allegations
concerned conduct occurring as late as 201 1-nearly three years after the
explosion of the crisis-that required Citigroup to accept government bailout
332money and that cost their shareholder's 94% of the value of their stock. In
short order after the government joined the lawsuit, Citigroup settled the claim
for $158.3 million and admitted to falsely certifying mortgage loans for
insurance and to not complying with disclosure rules. 3 3  The whistleblower
recently claimed that compliance at Citigroup has now changed: "The reporting
structure of the quality assurance function has changed, and I do believe the
attitude of upper management is 'we're going to do this right."' 334 In March
2012, two other FCA qui tam whistleblower suits were unsealed, both of which
allege that substantial fraud occurred at Countrywide and Bank of America.335
Additionally, the United States government settled claims with five lenders
related to mortgage fraud and abuse for $25 billion, which includes $227 million
328. Compare Lieber, supra note 157 (describing Richard Bowen's whistleblowing efforts to
Citigroup), with Jonathan Stewart, Citigroup Whistleblower: I Have No Regrets; Problems Persist,
Even After Crisis, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2012, 9:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/17/
us-citigroup-whistleblower-idUSTRE81G06Y20120217 (describing Citigroup's reaction to a 2011
whistleblower suit).
329. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
330. Lieber, supra note 157 (quoting Letter from Edward Skyler, Citigroup, to James H.
Jacoby, Producer, 60 Minutes (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://blog.citigroup.com/2011/12/citis-
response-to-december-4-60-minutes-story.shtml) (internal quotation marks omitted).
331. See Stewart, supra note 328.
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. Id. (quoting whistleblower Sherry Hunt).
335. See Amy Biegelsen & Emma Schwartz, New Whistleblower Cases Allege Continued
Bank Fraud, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar. 9, 2012, 10:34 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.
org/2012/03/09/8359/new-whistleblower-cases-allege-continued-bank-fraud.
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for whistleblowers who brought FCA qui tam cases. 3 3 6 In contrast to Bowen's
whistleblowing, which failed to change the alleged fraud occurring at Citigroup,
the whistleblowers seeking bounties have forced companies to take
responsibility for their wrongdoing.
337
Moreover, the bounty model serves as more substantial encouragement for
whistleblowers than the antiretaliation model. First, social science studies
demonstrate that employees blow the whistle because they hope the problem
they disclose will be resolved.338  The bounty model dovetails with this
motivation by addressing the underlying misconduct. Second, the model
sufficiently compensates whistleblowers for their risk.339  The antiretaliation
model, at best, provides remedies to whistleblowers that simply return them to
the ex ante position they would have maintained had they not blown the
whistle-hardly a positive inducement to risk the retaliation that often
accompanies whistleblowing. 340  The bounty model potentially puts the
whistleblower in a better place as a result of whistleblowing.
34 1
Finally, the Dodd-Frank version of the bounty model directs whistleblowers
342to external regulators in the SEC, which addresses another problem exposedby the financial crisis: Sarbanes-Oxley did not change the manner in which
336. Rick Rothacker, Whistleblowers Reap Millions in US. Mortgage Suits, REUTERS (Mar.
14, 2012, 7:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/us-settlement-whistleblowers-idUS
BRE82D1G620120314.
337. See id.; Stewart, supra note 328.
338. See Terance D. Miethe & Joyce Rothschild, Whistleblowing and the Control of
Organizational Misconduct, 64 SOC. INQUIRY 322, 333-37 (1994) (citations omitted) (providing
survey results demonstrating that a primary reason employees do not disclose misconduct is because
the employee believes that nothing will be done to correct the problem); see also MICELI & NEAR,
supra note 303, at 65-66 (citations omitted); Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan,
Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society,
29 AM. Bus. L.J. 267, 302 (1991) (citing U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., BLOWING THE WHISTLE IN
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 1980 AND 1983 SURVEY FINDINGS
31, 34 (1984)) ("The perceived ability to bring about change is more likely to encourage
whistleblowing than is reducing the fear of retaliation."); Karen L. Hooks et al., Enhancing
Communication to Assist in Fraud Prevention and Detection, 13 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 86,
93 (1994) (describing employees' motives for whistleblowing).
339. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 314, at 296-301 (citations omitted); Dyck et al.,
supra note 150, at 2214-15; Gonzalez, supra note 314, at 339 (citing Pamela H. Bucy, Games and
Stories: Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603, 675 (2004));
Rapp, supra note 257, at 119.
340. See Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1953 (1996) (noting that damages from a wrongful discharge tort claim puts an
employee "at best . . . in the same position had he not" acted in the public interest); see also Dyck et
al., supra note 150, at 2250-51 (analyzing the repercussions of whistleblowing).
341. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010) (recognizing that whistleblowers must be
"amply" rewarded because they have to choose between "telling the truth and the risk of
committing 'career suicide"'); Rapp, supra note 257, at 118-20 (citations omitted).
342. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
sec. 922(a), § 21F(a)(6), 124 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6)
(defining "whistleblower" as an individual or individuals who provide "information relating to a
violation of the securities laws" to the SEC),
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employees reported wrongdoing. As I noted above, and in contrast to my
prediction that Sarbanes-Oxley's structural model would lead to more reports to
independent audit committees,343 employees continued to disclose problems
most often to their supervisor, who could block and filter those reports before
they reached people who could address the problem.344 By encouraging external
reports directly to government regulators, Dodd-Frank may help solve this
problem.
345
However, reporting to outside regulators will work only if the SEC actually
responds to the reports. Although it is too early to examine the agency's
willingness to take these reports seriously, one might be skeptical about the
program given recent history with another government bounty program related to
taxes. In 2006, Congress strengthened the tax bounty whistleblower program,
which provides rewards for individuals who report tax evasion and fraud.346 Yet,
despite receiving over 1,300 whistleblower reports since then, the Internal
Revenue Service has approved, at most, a "small" number of awards. 347 A GAO
report in 2011 criticized the IRS's administration of the system, concluding that
the IRS takes too long to process claims, lacks effective internal control on the
review process, and fails to communicate with whistleblowers and with
343. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 5, at 1141-49 (citations omitted).
344. See ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 247, at 5; Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 5, at
1121-25 (citations omitted) (describing executive blocking and filtering of whistleblower
disclosures).
345. Despite heavy pressure from corporate interests, the SEC regulations to implement the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty program do not require internal reporting before reporting to the
SEC. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,301 (June
13, 2011) (noting that "[c]ommenters were sharply divided on ... this topic"); Edward Wyatt,
Overcoming Dissenters, S.E.C. Adopts Revised Whistle-Blower Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011,
at B3 (noting opposition by the United States Chamber of Commerce and other business interests);
Peter J. Henning, A Greater Incentive for Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2011), http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/dealing-with-the-s-e-c-s-new-whistle-blower-program/ (asserting that
the internal reporting rules were the focus of a "lobbying battle"). However, the regulations include
incentives for internal reporting. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed
Reg. at 34,325; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21 F-4(c)(3). For example, if the whistleblower reports internally
and the company self-reports to the SEC, the whistleblower will be eligible for any financial
reward. See id.
346. See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. A, tit. IV, § 406,
120 Stat. 2922, 2923 (Dec. 20, 2006) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2006)); see also
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS: INCOMPLETE DATA HINDERS
IRS'S ABILITY TO MANAGE CLAIM PROCESSING TIME AND ENHANCE EXTERNAL
COMMUNICATION 3-4 (2011) (describing 2006 changes).
347. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 346, at 1. The IRS refuses to release
publicly the number of awards because of privacy concerns. See id. at 1-2. Journalists have
reported that the IRS has made only one award that has become known publicly. See Laura
Saunders, IRS Whistleblower Program Faulted, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10-11, 2011, at B9; Michael
Hudson, IRS Red Tape, Old Guard Slow Whistleblowing on Corporate Tax Cheats, CENTER FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (June 22, 2011), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/06/22/4979/irs-red-tape-old-
guard-slow-whistleblowing-corporate-tax-cheats.
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Congress. 348  Whistleblower advocates assert that cumbersome regulations,
delays, and lack of support from high-ranking administrators in the IRS and the
Treasury Department have created a dysfunctional system. 349  Similar to the
dysfunction with OSHA's administration of Sarbanes-Oxley's antiretaliation
protections, administrative recalcitrance can undermine the bounty model as
well.
Moreover, the SEC specifically has a checkered past when dealing with
whistleblowers. 350 Although the SEC received copies of every Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower complaint filed with OSHA over the last decade,351 the agency
admitted that it never followed up on these complaints even though they often
included evidence of corporate securities misconduct. 352  The SEC already
administers a whistleblower bounty program under the Insider Trading and
Securities Enforcement Act of 1988,353 and had issued rewards under that
program totaling less than $200,000 as of the middle of 2010.3"4 The SEC's
Office of Inspector General evaluated the program and concluded it has been
minimally successful, in part because the SEC failed to track crucial information
or adequately follow up on tips.355 Furthermore, and perhaps most damning, the
agency and the Department of Justice ignored specific whistleblower tips
regarding numerous problems before the financial crisis.356 For example, years
348. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 346, at 8-20 (citations omitted).
349. See Hudson, supra note 347; Erika Kelton, Whistle-Blowers Get No Respect from IRS,
MSN MONEY (Mar. 5, 2012, 8:37 PM), http://money.msn.com/tax-tips/post.aspx?post=69c7e4O-
b475-4257-8b9c-ecf8c37727d8; Jesse Drucker & Peter S. Green, IRS Resists Whistle-Blowers
Despite Wide US. Tax Gap, BLOOMBERG.COM (June 19, 2012 5:00 AM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2012-06-19/irs-resists-whistleblowers-despite-wide-u-s-tax-gap.htmi ("The IRS
whistle-blower program ... has become the place where allegations of tax avoidance go to die.").
350. See Rapp, supra note 257, at 136-39 (citations omitted) (detailing reasons "why the SEC
is likely to remain a roadblock to whistleblowers seeking bounties" under Dodd-Frank).
351. See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(a) (2006).
352. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 5, at 148-49; see also Rapp, supra
note 257, at 126-29 (citations omitted) (detailing cases in which SEC failed to utilize Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblower tips).
353. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988).
354. Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 125 (2011) (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.-
OFFICE OF AUDITS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC'S BOUNTY PROGRAM 5
(Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter SEC IG BOUNTY ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.sec-
oig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/2010/474.pdf). In late July 2010, the SEC announced that it
awarded $1 million to a whistleblower whose disclosures led to a $28 million settlement with the
hedge fund Pequot Capital Management. See Castellina, supra note 131, at 193 & n.49.
355. See SEC IG BOUNTY ASSESSMENT, supra note 354, at4.
356. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 158, at 441-42 (quoting OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD
MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME-PUBLIC VERSION 20-21 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf) (describing the SEC's failure to act upon information
received regarding Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme).
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before Bernard Madoffs ponzi scheme fell apart publicly, a whistleblower
repeatedly warned the SEC that Madoff's investment fund engaged in fraud.357
That said, perhaps Dodd-Frank will change the SEC's approach to
whistleblowers, because the statute institutionalized whistleblowing in the
agency by creating an Office of the Whistleblower.358 Before Dodd-Frank, the
SEC did not have an organized and efficient system in place to handle tips;
359
now the SEC's Office of the Whistleblower includes a Chief, a Deputy Chief,
five attorneys, and a paralegal whose jobs are to investigate those claims. 360 The
Office operates a fund of more than $450 million that will be used to pay
whistleblower rewards.36' During the first seven weeks the program operated, it
received 334 reports,362 the quality of which was "remarkably high," according
to a former SEC official.363 In its first year after its August 2011 effective date,
the program received nearly 3,000 tips, but has issued just one reward: a $50,000
payment to an unidentified whistleblower who received 30% of the $150,000
collected in a fraud case.
364
Additionally, Dodd-Frank may support the structural model by.
reinvigorating corporate internal reporting systems. Corporate interests
357. See, e.g., Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
111 th Cong. 102 (2009) (statement of Harry Markopolus, Chartered Fin. Analyst) (stating that "[als
early as May 2000, I provided evidence to the SEC's Boston Regional Office that should have
caused an investigation of Madoff. I re-submitted this evidence with additional support several
times between 2000-2008, a period of nine years. Yet nothing was done."); Castellina, supra note
131, at 202 ("[T]he failure to catch these frauds did not lie with the lack of tips received by the SEC,
but rather with the SEC itself."); Christine Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative):
Bernie Madoff, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 947, 954-55 & n.45.
358. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
sec. 924(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1850 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7 (2010));
Welcome to the Office of the Whistleblower, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/
whistleblower (last visited Sept. 16, 2012).
359. See Castellina, supra note 131, at 203.
360. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 3 (2011).
361. See id. at 9. The fund also finances the operations of the SEC Inspector General's internal
suggestion program. See id. As of July 2012, the fund had amassed $452 million to be used for
whistleblower payouts. Paul Tharp, SEC Set to Hand Out up to $452M to Fraud Busters, N.Y.
POST, July 7, 2012, at 24.
362. U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, supra note 360, at 5.
363. Samuel Rubenfeld, SEC Receives 334 Tips in First Seven Weeks of Whistleblower
Program, WSJ BLOGS (Nov. 16, 2011, 3:21 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/201 1/
11/16/sec-receives-334-tips-in-first-seven-weeks-of-whistleblower-program/; see also Tharp, supra
note 361 (quoting a securities lawyer who asserted that the SEC receives "two to three tips every
day that are worth pursuing").
364. See Samuel Rubenfeld, SEC Whistleblower Office Gets Nearly 3,000 Tips, WSJ BLOGS
(Oct. 18, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/10/18/sec-whistleblower-
office-gets-nearly-3000-tips/. The case imposed multimillion-dollar fines, so the whistleblower
may receive more if the SEC collects more from the defendant. See Samuel Rubenfeld, SEC Issues
First Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Award, WSJ BLOGS (Aug. 21, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://blogs.
wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/08/2 1/sec-issues-first-dodd-frank-whistleblower-award/.
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predicted the opposite result when the SEC promulgated its regulations for
Dodd-Frank because the agency rebuffed corporate efforts to require
365whistleblowers to report internally before reporting to the SEC. However,
some early evidence indicates that corporations have strengthened their internal
systems out of fear that the Act's financial rewards will entice employees to
report to the SEC.366 One recent survey found that employees internally reported
fraud at an "all-time high" rate during the fourth quarter of 2011.367 This quarter
was the third straight quarter of "new all-time highs," and the CEO of the
company responsible for the survey speculated that companies responded to
Dodd-Frank by reemphasizing antiretaliation policies and communicating more
effectively with employees.368
The application of the bounty model to the private sector will be important
to evaluate over the coming years. If successful, it might be worth exploring
whether it can be applied more broadly. For example, one scholar proposed
369using the model for safety and health whistleblowers. Such proposals, as well
as Dodd-Frank itself, result directly from Sarbanes-Oxley because Sarbanes-
Oxley opened the door to more creative thinking about using whistleblowers as
part of the nation's law enforcement strategy. Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley raised
our consciousness of the important role that whistleblowers can play in detecting
misconduct. The Act's grand failures led to even further experimentation and a
move away from relying almost exclusively on the antiretaliation model. 370 In
particular, Sarbanes-Oxley's failure to prevent the subprime mortgage crisis
paved the way for Dodd-Frank's remarkable use of the bounty model to
encourage whistleblowers more effectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sarbanes-Oxley initiated a decade of impressive growth in the development
of formal whistleblower provisions, such as including whistleblower protection
in significant federal legislation and mandating the widespread use of codes of
ethics and whistleblower hotlines. Despite these successes, Sarbanes-Oxley's
failures may teach the Act's most significant lesson: that the antiretaliation and
structural whistleblower models, while necessary, do not sufficiently protect and
encourage whistleblowers. The Act failed to protect victims of retaliation
adequately, and it did not prevent or remedy the underlying misconduct
disclosed by whistleblowers. The experience with Sarbanes-Oxley over the last
decade teaches that individual players in the system, such as organizational
365. See sources cited supra note 345.
366. See, e.g., Yin Wilczek, Employees' Internal Fraud Reports Rise Even in Wake of SEC
Whistleblower Program, 69 DAILY LAB. REP., A-8 (Apr. 10, 2012).
367. Id. at A-9.
368. Id.
369. See Gonzalez, supra note 314, at 347, 349.
370. See Castellina, supra note 131, at 194-200 (citations omitted).
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supervisors, government administrators, and adjudicatory decisionmakers,
impact whistleblowers as much as, if not more than, any formal legal provisions,
and can undermine the protections they appear to provide. Moreover, the failure
of whistleblowers to prevent the recent financial crisis exposed the limitations of
the antiretaliation and structural models.
These conclusions indicate that perhaps we ought to spend as much effort
determining who is involved in whistleblower protection as we do deciding what
those protections should formally entail. If new leadership at OSHA and on the
ARB can change the approach of those institutions to whistleblower protection,
then it would confirm that choosing the right people to lead whistleblower
protection efforts could be as important as having the right whistleblower
provisions.
Moreover, because of Sarbanes-Oxley's national prominence, its failings
provided the opportunity to strengthen and improve encouragement for
whistleblowing. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act included a more direct incentive for
whistleblowers: bounty payments. 371 In other words, Sarbanes-Oxley made
possible the evolutionary leap from the Act's antiretaliation protection and
structural encouragement to Dodd-Frank's bounty payments. If Dodd-Frank
permits more effective whistleblowing by addressing the underlying
wrongdoing, then its bounty model may come to be seen as an essential part of a
comprehensive legislative approach to supplement the conventional use of
statutory antiretaliation protection and whistleblower hotlines.
If these changes make a difference in the future, then Sarbanes-Oxley's
failings could demonstrate that policymakers should think more broadly than
simply protecting whistleblowers from retaliation and providing a structural
disclosure channel and code of ethics. A decade from now, we may look back
on Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower provisions with more generous eyes. Rather
than focus on their failings, we may view them as important first steps toward a
more comprehensive whistleblower strategy.
371. See supra notes 310-27 and accompanying text.
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